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INTRODUCTION

Who is in the best position to know what a student should learn?
It is with that single question that this entire dissertation
is concerned.

The excursions in it, which range from Zen Buddhism,

to Philosophy of Science, to Cognitive Psychology, to the Physiology
of the Eye, and beyond merely represent an attempt to approach the
problem from a number of different perspectives.

Thus, however far

from the well-worn path of education this dissertation may travel, I
would beg the reader to keep the single focus always in mind.

For

that focus remains continually in my mind as I write, and should it
escape the notice of the reader that fact merely bespeaks the
difficulty of communicating on paper all that needs to be communicated
simultaneously.
It would only be fair to say that it is not really the question
which dominates all aspects of this treatise.

Rather, it is a

particular answer to the question which has guided my reading, which
has dictated my selection of references and quotations, and which
underlies the style and argumentation throughout.

I believe that

STUDENTS ARE ALWAYS THE BEST JUDGE OF WHAT THEY, INDIVIDUALLY, SHOULD'
LEARN AT EVERY POINT IN THEIR LIVES.

That is my bias, and it is a

strong one which permeates all that is written here as a means of
defending, explaining, and extrapolating that bias.

As an educator, I am concerned with students - how they learn,
what they learn, and what they need to learn.

As a man, I am

concerned with the more ultimate questions of what knowledge and
existence are; of how men are able to answer and even ask such
questions; of what it means to be a human being in a chaotic and,
perhaps, meaningless world.

But, unlike so many of the educators

that I know and whose articles or books I have read, I cannot succeed
in separating my professional from my human life.

Nor do I want to.

I teach, I write, I do "scholarly research", and I think about
educational issues with the same mind and feelings and as the same
person who hugs his wife tightly every night and sometimes refuses
to eat her potato pancakes.
This document is, thus, both a demonstration and an explanation
_of_the unique unity-in-diversity of human perspectives.

A demonstra¬

tion in the extent to which my particular biases color all that I
write here.

An explanation in the conventional sense of logical

argumentation, citation of examples, and the building of models of
the world.

The logic of the argument is painfully simple, and should

thus be schematized here so that the reader can see the remainder of
this document as variations on a theme or embellishments on a simple
picture:
The world exists as no-thing.
’Human beings construct their worlds actively out of their
experience.
Human experience is private.
I

ii

Hence, individually constructed worlds are private.
Hence, the constructor knows best what he has constructed.
Hence, the constructor knows best what comes next to keep
the structure alive.
Were I to list the individuals who have contributed to the
writing of this piece, it would have to include every person I’ve
ever met, every author of every book, article, movie, piece of music,
etc., I've ever experienced.

Some individuals stand out over others,

and they are quoted or referred to throughout.

If I have misinter¬

preted them or been led astray by them, then that is merely another
demonstration of the extent of my biases and I make no apologies for
it.

If I have interpreted them as they intended or if I write things

that fit the constructed worlds of others, I place the credit where
it is due - in the biases of the influencers and the influenced.
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CHAPTER

I

There are two kinds of people in this world:
those who
divide the world into two kinds and those who do not.

It is nothing new to characterize Western Philosophy as varia¬
tions on the basic theme of realism.

The Western "common man" and

the more sophisticated Western Scientist are both fairly naive
realists.^

Perhaps, as Benjamin Lee Whorf would suggest,^ our

language compels us to be realists, though, of course, we would like
to think that the universe itself is the source of our compulsion.
To put it simply, we tend to believe that the world, with all the
characteristics that we perceive in it, exists independently of our
observations of it.
Our language, and our attitude toward our language, is more
indicative of our basic realism than anything else.

The preponder¬

ance of nouns and adjectives, for example, is no mere coincidence.
Rather, it is an indication of the great extent to which we have
categories for our perceptions of the world.

But, even more impor¬

tantly, it is our attitude toward those nouns and adjectives which
is crucial.

When we say, for example, that a book is an "object" we

mean that the book, independent of our contact with it, possesses
certain characteristics

(perhaps the primary characteristics noted by

Locke)^ which, if we perceive them "correctly", make it fall naturally
into a natural category of other things which possess the same
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characteristics.
see it or not.

The world, for us, exists whether we are there to
Furthermore, it exists with a host of ''natural"

attributes ranging from primary and secondary characteristics to
physical

laws

all of which merely await our discovery.

"Discovery" is, in fact, the key word.

We like to think that

Newton discovered the laws of gravity in much the same way that
Columbus discovered America.

The laws of gravity, like America, were

always "there", operating in the universe, merely awaiting a Newton
to come along with sufficient objectivity and intelligence to find
them.

Indeed, it is in the progress of Western science, and in our

conceptions of what that progress means and how it has occurred, that
our realism is most evident (see Chapter III).

We are, of course,

willing to admit that some things are harder to "discover" than others,
but even when we speak of the "mysteries of the universe" we see them
as naturally existing mysteries awaiting a discoverer with sufficient
vision to see them for what they "really" are.
It is in this context of the knower as discoverer of the
objective that some of the features of our language become a bit
revealing.

We tend to speak of the process of gaining knowledge

primarily via the distal senses - sight and hearing.
We have visions of Ultimate Reality.
Seeing is believing.

We see the truth.

A right answer sounds right.

It is, I would suggest, because we consider

sight and hearing to be totally passive, undistorting sensory modes
that we place so much confidence in them as means toward knowledge.
i

The sense of touch, for example, will simply not do as a means for us
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to gain knowledge.

For to touch something is to manipulate it, to

change it through interaction with it, to be unsure of how much that
one feels is in the thing and how much is in the feeler.

It is not

coincidence that we always see and hear knowledge, but never feel it.
"I see" can substitute for "I understand", but "I feel" cannot.
Why?

Because we have convinced ourselves that seeing is a very simple

process which does not change or distort what is coming into the mind
from the world outside.

The eye, we believe, is merely a window whose

function it is to let the world come into the "mind's eye" as it
"really" is.

The psychological absurdity of these notions of percep¬

tion will be discussed later, for it is the implied philosophy of such
a perspective, and the extent to which it permeates what we do, say,
and even think that concerns me here.
No matter how hard I might try, in 20th Century America, speaking
and thinking in 20th Century American, I am doomed to look at the world
through the blinders of some form of realism.

My language and my

entire cultural heritage demand of me that I see myself as an observer
of a world which exists independently of me.

I am constantly forced

to speak of my "self" as a subject which is constantly trying to gain
knowledge of objects.

The subject is "naturally

different from the

object, and the object "naturally" possesses the characteristics which
I can come to know if I am "objective" enough.

The closest I can come

to describing this notion of the universe which we constantly carry
around is through the following picture:

,
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We, as observers, touch the world which is a separate entity from
our "selves".

The knowledge that we gain through touching (i.e., see¬

ing, hearing, smelling, tasting, etc.) the world is more accurate,
more valid, the more "objective" it is.
my act of knowing is,

That is, the more impersonal

the more I tend to believe that it is valid.

The less of my self I see invested in my act of knowledge, the more
I can believe that 1 have really learned something about that world
outside of me.
What is disastrously missing from such an account of the act of
knowledge,

typical though I think it is of a Western man's approach,

is any awareness of the large amount of personal commitment which is
required for knowledge of any kind.

Indeed, the entire notion of

"objective", "impersonal" knowledge is a ridiculous one.

Even in

Western, dualistic terms, knowledge is always knowledge £f something
by someone.

To equate the purest knowledge with the removal of the

knower makes as little sense as it would to equate knowledge with
removal of the thing known.

As an ideal, objective knowledge is both

impossible and ludicrous, a point which Michael Polanyi has made most
adequately in his PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
Polanyi's argument is an interesting one, and though I don't
believe he carries it fr.r enough, it represents a good starting point
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for leaving the naive realism which I've been describing above and
moving towards what I consider to be a more viable approach to the
nature of knowledge.
Polanyi argues that knowledge at all levels depends upon a
personal commitment to ideas,
selves "known".

values,

or beliefs which are not in them¬

I am able to know one thing only because I am deeply

committed to something else which I do not,

strictly, know.

haps, Polanyi's own analogies will help explain his intent.

But,

per¬

His

notions of "personal knowledge" and of the necessity for indefensible
commitment as a foundation of all knowledge hinge on the following
distinction between Pocal and Subsidiary awareness:
When we use a hammer to drive in a nail, we attend to
both nail and hammer, but in a different way.

We watch

the effect of our strokes on the nail and try to wield the
hammer so as to hit the nail most effectively.

When we

bring down the hammer we do not feel that its handle has
struck our palm and the fingers that hold the hammer...
I have a subsidiary awareness of the feeling in the palm
of my hand which is ^nerged into my focal awareness of my
driving in the nail.
There are several things which I see as crucial in the above
quotation.

First of all, my focal awareness of driving in the nail

depends upon my subsidiary awareness of feelings in the palm of my
hand.

I cannot concentrate on driving in the nail unless I "surrender

myself" to those feelings in the palm.

Indeed,

if I turn the focus

of my attention to the feelings in the palm of my hand,

I will no

longer be able to drive in the nail.

Furthermore,

attention' on the feelings in my palm,

the act of doing so would

require subsidiary awareness of,

if I did focus

or personal commitment to, a host of
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other matters. I cannot possibly be aware of all that I know, all that
1 believe, all that I am doing, or all that I value at any particular
time.

And I cannot be aware of anything unless I surrender myself,

commit myself, to a host of unanalyzed, unsupported ideas, values,
and feelings.
Polanyi’s over-all treatment of "subsidiary awareness" supplies
the first step away from the naive realism which seems to me to per¬
vade the West.

When, for example, I measure the length of a piece of

wood and find myself able to say that "this piece of wood is 27 1/2"
long", my participation in that act of knowledge and my confidence in
its success rely upon my unquestioning commitment to a whole gamut of
beliefs.

And as soon as I turn my attention to those other beliefs,

I have shattered my original act of knowledge.

Measuring that board,

for example, requires that I assume the accuracy of my tape measure,
and if I begin to question (or even think about) that assumption I am
no longer gaining knowledge of the length of the board.

I cannot have

focal and subsidiary awareness of the same thing at the same time.

To

be focally aware of anything requires that I have subsidiary awareness
of many other things.

And my subsidiary awareness is a matter of

personal commitment, unquestioning loyalty, living in.

In order to

know anything, I must live in an entire system of beliefs which I do
not and can not question.
Polanyi’s treatment of personal knowledge raises one other issue
which I find of much interest; he treats knowledge as an act of skill
rather than as a product*, as a process rather than an end state.
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Though much less explicitly than either Dewey5 or Whitehead,6
Polanyi seems to be moving toward a cosmology-whose basic components
are processes and experiences rather than things and ideas.
of knowledge is defined by
is undergoing,

The act

the knower’s experience, the process he

and not by the product he gains through that process.

Although Polanyi never comes out and says it, I suspect that he comes
close to meaning by "He knows x" that "He has had the experience of
living in x."

Whether Polanyi intended to define knowledge as a process or not,
I clo so intend and it is my difference with Polanyi on this point and
on "living in"

here.

that will move us toward the cosmology I am proposing

Rather than arguing, as Polanyi tends to, that knowledge

requires skill, subsidiary awareness, and living in, I would contend
that knowledge is^ subsidiary awareness.
living in.
to be

Knowledge is the process of

Furthermore, I consider the crucial element of "living in"

the fact that it is a totally un-self-conscious process.

is, I have subsidiary awareness of the hammer in

That

the palm of my hand

only when I am totally unaware of my "self" "having" such sensations.
To put the whole thing more bluntly,
when there is no
knowledge of.

"I" gaining knowledge and no "something" to be gained

Or,

to sound more Dewey-like, knowledge is neither

subjective nor objective.
object;

I_ gain knowledge of something

Rather, it is the merging of subject and

the erasure of the distinction between the knower and the

thing known.

,
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The distinction between an act of knowledge as I would describe
it and the same act as a realist might describe it can best be
exemplified in the following accounts of the skill of a master chess
player:
REALIST:

What makes the master chess player invincible
is the fact that he is capable of "planning
ahead" more moves than the average player.
Each time a master chess player makes a move
he has considered several other possibilities
and consciously rejected them because of
their foreseen consequences.
The master chess
player is able to carry the sequence "If I
do this then he'll do this and I'll do this
and he'll do this..." out to more terms than
the average player.

ME:

Your description of the master chess player
may apply to a good chess player, and it may
describe a "stage" through which most masters
go along the way toward becoming masters,
but it does not describe the Master at work.
The Master does not plan ahead self¬
consciously and analyze the merits of all
possible moves.
Rather, he concentrates on
the board and the game until he is completely
un-self-conscious ; until there is no master,
no opponent, no chess game.
The Master is
able to live in the chess game he is playing
and he moves with the pattern that i£ both
he and the game.
(My thanks are due to
Stuart Thorsby^ a master chess player, for
this example.)

By his living in the game, by his discarding the distinction
between himself and the game, the master chess player is participating
in an act of knowledge as I would describe it,
-Knowledge, as I am describing it, is a process and is defined by
the feeling of the knower.

Indeed, "I feel" seems to me to be much

closer to "I understand" than is "I see."

When a person achieves the

feeling of total un-self-consciousness about whatever he is doing, he
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is participating in an act of knowledge.

What the person is doing

is really irrelevant, for it could range from chess playing to read¬
ing a book to performing a chemistry experiment to making love. How
the person does what he does, in what spirit, with what feeling, and
with how much "awareness of self" - these are the things which define
acts of knowledge.
Such acts of knowledge have been described and analyzed by a host
of other authors in a wide variety of different contexts.

When

William James x^rote about the varieties of mystical experience he was

g
describing such acts of knowledge.

John Dewey’s descriptions of the
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aesthetic experience amount to the same.

Arthur Koestler’s analysis

of creativity in humor, art, and science is an attempt to focus on
such experiences.^
of insight"

Descriptions in the history of science of "flashes

(Archimedes' bathtub experience, or Galileo's confidence

in s=l/2gt , or Kekule's carbon-chain dreams or Watson and Crick's
immersion in their atomic models...) have the same subject.

The

Zen literature from its Koan's to its tales of satori speaks of such
acts of knowledge.12

The more recent psychedelic literature is focused

almost entirely on describing such "non-self" experiences.
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And this

list could go on and on and on.
But, interestingly enough, some of the most vivid and meaningful
descriptions of the

act of knowledge come from the world of the

schizophrenic (a fact which I will take up in a later chapter).
Consider, for example, the following description taken from Karl
Jaspers' GENERAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY:
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I believe I caused the illness myself.
In my attempt to
penetrate the other world I met its natural guardians, the
embodiment of my own weaknesses and faults.
I first thought
these demons were lowly inhabitants of the other world who
would play me like a ball because I went into these regions
unprepared and lost my way.
Later I thought they were splitoff parts of my own mind which existed near me in free space
and thrived on my feelings.
I believed everyone else had
these too but did not perceive them, thanks to the protective
successful deceit of the feeling of personal existence.
I
thought the latter was an artifact of memory, thought-complexes,
etc. , a doll that was nice enough to look at from outside
but nothing real inside it.
In my case the personal self had grown porous because of
my dimmed consciousness.
Through it I wanted to bring myself
closer to the higher sources of life.
I should have prepared
myself for this over a long period by invoking in me a higher,
impersonal self, since ’nectar’ is not for mortal lips.
It
acted destructively on the animal-human self, split it up into
its parts.
These gradually disintegrated, the doll was really
broken and the body damaged.
I had forced untimely access to
the ’source of life,’ the curse of the ’gods’ descended on me.
I recognized too late that murky elements had taken a hand.
I got to know them after they had already too much power.
There was no way back.
I now had the world of spirits I had
wanted to see. . The demons came up from the abyss, as
guardian Cerberi, denying admission to the unauthorized.
I
decided to take up the life-and-death struggle.
This meant
for me in the end a decision to die, since I had to put
aside everything that maintained the enemy, but this was
also everything that maintained life.
I wanted to enter
death without going mad and stood before the Sphinx:
either
thou into the abyss or i!
Then came illumination.
I fasted and so penetrated into
the true nature of my seducers.
They were pimps and deceivers
of my dear personal self which seemed as much a thing of
naught as they.
A larger and more comprehensive self emerged
and I could abandon the previous personality with its entire
entourage.
I saw this earlier personality could never enter
transcendental realms.
I felt as a result a terrible pain,
like an annihilating blow, but I was rescued, the demons
shriveled, vanished and perished.
A new life began for me
and from now on I felt different from other people.
A self
that consisted of conventional lies, shams, self-deceptions,
memory images, a self just like that of other people, grew
in me again but behind and above it stood a greater and more
comprehensive self rfhich impressed me with something of what
is eternal, unchanging, immortal and inviolable and which
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ever since that time has been my protector and refuge.
I
believe it would be good for many if they were acquainted
with such a higher self and that there are people who have
attained this goal in fact by kinder means.
Similar descriptions of "ego-loss" experiences, acts of knowledge,
abound in much of the existential literature15 and in such lucid
compilations of the experiences of schizophrenics as Bert Kaplan's
THE INNER WORLD OF MENTAL ILLNESS.16
Certainly, deeply religious experiences are precisely the same
kind of thing and at a level of intensity equal to or greater than
that described above.

As R.D. Laing argues in his excellent THE

POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE,
Most people most of the time experience themselves and
others in one or another way that I shall call egoic.
That
is, centrally or peripherally, they experience the world
and themselves in terms of a consistent identity, a me-here
over against a you-there, within a framework of certain
ground structures of space and time shared with other members
of their society.
...all religious and all existential philosophers have
agreed that such egoic experience is a preliminary illusion,
a veil, a film of maya — a dream to Heraclitus, and to
Lao Tzu, the fundamental illusion of all Buddhism, a state
of sleep, of death, of socially accepted madness, a womb
state to which one has to die, from which one has to be
born.
The ’ego1 is the instrument for living in this world.
If the ’ego’ is broken up or destroyed (by the insurmountable
contradictions of certain life situations, by toxins, chemical
changes, etc.), then the person may be exposed to other
worlds, ’real' in different ways from the more familiar
territory of dreams, imagination, perception or fantasy.
What I am calling an act of knowledge is not, except in my will
ingness to allow for such experiences in much less intense manners,
different from the above accounts.

Nor do I see any difference in

the following taken from the Gospel according to Thomas:
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Jesus said to them:
When you make the two one, and
when you make the inner as the outer
and the outer as the inner and the above
as the below, and when
you make the male and female into a single one,
so that the male will not be the male and
the female not be female, when you make
eyes in the place of an eye, and a foot in the place
of a foot, and an image in the place of an image,
then shall you enter the Kingdom.

CHAPTER

IX

WHAT WE THINK IS LESS THAN WHAT WE KNOW;
WHAT WE KNOW IS LESS THAN WHAT WE LOVE;
WHAT WE LOVE IS SO MUCH LESS THAN WHAT THERE IS;
AND TO THAT PRECISE EXTENT WE ARE SO MUCH LESS THAN
WHAT WE ARE.

If the act of knowledge is to be conceived as I have described it,
then the world must exist in quite a different manner than we, as
realists,

tend to assume.

then the "real*
assume.

If knowledge is feeling, ego-loss, process,

world must be built of different stuff than we normally

Let me begin to describe what the world must be like if acts

of knowledge as I have described them are to be taken seriously.
An nact of knowledge" in any philsophical scheme, including mine,
must have something to do with the "knower" getting in touch with
"reality".

The question to which this chapter must address itself,

then, is the ontological one of what kind of "reality" it is that a
person gains knowledge of by living in.

If knowledge is not gained in

the traditionally described manner, if verbalization is not a key
component of knowledge, and if ego-loss is crucial to knowledge, then
the world of language-bound concepts and categories must be illusory
in some sense of the word.
the world is

To put it more radically and succinctly,

"really" an undifferentiated whole which we have become

accustomed to slicing up in arbitrary manners,

There are no naturally

existing categories in the world, and any such categories which we use
are our arbitrary inventions.

The fact that human beings use and per¬

ceive the world through conceptual schemes says more about the way in

which man shapes his perceptual world than about what the ''world" is
The world exists naturally as "no-thing" until man comes along

like.

and creates things through his active processes of perception (see
Chapter VI) .
Consider some simple examples.

There is a new book sitting on

my desk which I have never seen before.

I look at the front of it,

then walk around the desk and look at it upside down.
tions

My two percep¬

(the book cover right-side-up and the book cover upside down)

are completely different.

The two visual fields have nothing in common

And yet, I comfortably say that I am "seeing the same thing" in both
cases.

The "thing" that I see is my_ creation, not the world's.

If I

find it easy to attribute those two perceptions to an "object" called
a "book" which exists independently of me with definable characteris¬
tics, that is because I have arbitrarily created for myself a whole
system of categories for looking at the world.

It is the system of

categories that requires me to see a "book", not the "pure" infor¬
mation from the world.
The arbitrariness of our "slicing up" of reality is, of course,
more obvious in the words and concepts that we use than in our per¬
ceptions of the world.

It is not terribly difficult, for example, for

us as realists to admit of a certain amount of fuzziness in distin
guishing between such abstract categories as "life" and "death".
When it comer, to answering such questions as "Is a man dead when his
heart stops even though most of the cells in his body are still alive?
we will admit to a certain amount of high-handedness in arbitrarily
drawing a line somewhere.

But we will continue to insist that the two
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categories are 'basically" sound - that a living man is naturally
different from a non-living rock,

And, much more fundamentally, we

will insist that the perceived separateness

of different objects is,

indeed, natural and not dictated by our arbitrary whims.

After all,

we would insist, "I" am a different "thing" from the "typewriter" I
am now using.

But, am I?

"Really"?

If the world is more like the above picture than the picture on
page four, Chapter I, then am I?

"Really"?

Let us consider, for the moment as a possibility only,
world" as depicted in the picture above.

the "real

In such a world, all distinc¬

tions, all categorizations, all "slicings up" of the world are in¬
accurate, for the world is "really" an undifferentiated whole.

Any

distinctions between objects or characteristics that are made in such
a world are inaccurate in the sense that they are arbitrary, man-made,
and not dictated by the nature of the world.

In such a world, the

words and categories which human beings employ are arbitrary and not
required by naturally existing differences among "objects" in the
world.

I must also note that in such a world of complete lack of

differentiations, one can, if he chooses, divide the world up into
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categories in an infinite number of ways, all of which will "work"
equally well.

A world which is not divided into parts at all can

b<2 categorized in an infinite number of ways.

Just as I can take a

piece of clean white paper and cut it up in an infinitude on manners,
so can I arbitrarily impose an infinitude of category systems of an
undifferentiated world.
Most importantly,

the existence of a reality which is completely

undifferentiated requires us to give up our fundamental distinction
between subject and object.

As depicted in the figure above, the sub¬

ject which touches the world is^ the world which it touches.

The dis¬

tinction between subject and object, knower and the known, is as
artificial a contrivance as any other set of categories which we might
impose on the world.

The point whereat a person decides that his

"self" ends and the "world" begins is as arbitrary a distinction as
any of the others which we make.

Does my "self", include all of my

body, or only part of it, or none of it?
I am wearing?

Does it include the clothes

ify most valued possessions?

My most intimate friends?

The answers to such questions are arbitrary and whimsical, since "in
fact" the assumption that there is some naturally valid distinction
between self and non-self is an invalid one.
Perhaps an analogy will help to describe the undifferentiated
world as I would have the reader see it, though the ontology I am
describing makes analogizing, and verbal description of any kind, a
dangerous and shaky business.

A world which has no naturally existing

categories cannot be described adequately in words which are, by
definition,

categories.

For the reader who wishes to see as good a
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verbal description of the non-verbal world as I can imagine, I
recommend the last chapter of R.D. Laing's THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE.1
By emphasizing certain aspects of recent developments in laser
beam photography, however, I can come close to supplying a useful
analogy for describing the naturally uncategorized world.

The method

produces a photographic plate, called a "hologram", which has interest¬
ing properties.

Looked at in natural light,

the hologram is merely a

mass of wavy, orange-red lines - interference patterns of light
produced in the process of making the "photograph".

But when the

entire plate is illuminated from behind by high intensity light, the
object photographed appears in color, with three dimensions, and depth
of field

(i.e. by moving one’s head to the side of the hologram, one

can see around and behind objects in the picture).

And if any small

piece of the hologram is illuminated with a high intensity light,

the

entire photograph is visible, still in color, three dimensions, and
with depth of field.

The entire picture is contained in the totality

of the hologram, as well as in every point of the hologram.

The world is like a hologram.

Every point is exactly the same as

every other point, and every point is exactly the same as the whole
which is exactly the same as any combination of points.
breaks down at only one place:

The analogy

when we talk about the hologram we can

speak of separate points which we can distinguish from one another by
their location in space.

The world is like a hologram in which nothing

can get outside to distinguish the

separate

points.

’’There is no way to step off the treadmill.
It is all treadmill."
(Wallace Stegner, ALL THE LITTLE
LIVE THINGS)2
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Or, if you prefer,

the world is like a hologram without distinguish¬

able points.
Before proceeding to defend this conception of the world as
hologram, a few words must be said about words.

A reality which is

undivided cannot be adequately described by any process which divides,
and language is by nature such a process.

To merely utter a word is

to divide a reality which is not, in itself, divided.

The world as

hologram and knowledge as "living in" are simply not susceptible to
adequate verbalization since the very use of words negates the crucial
notion of unity.

On the other hand, it would be far from the mark

for the reader to conclude that the ontology which I am describing
requires human beings to refrain from ever using words.

For words,

like every "thing" else in the world are points on the hologram, there¬
by containing all that the world is.
as easily

To put it another way, one can

(or with as much difficulty) live in language as one can

live in anything else.

The dangers and advantages of language are the

same as the dangers and advantages of non-language, for knowledge is
an act, a process, not a "thing".

Consider the following Haiku poem:

The old pond.
A frog jumps in,
The sound of water.
Insofar as we analyze, divide, interpret, project symbolism and in
any other way separate ourselves or the world from the poem, we are not
gaining knowledge.

But insofar as we live in the poem, feel it, feel

ourselves in it and it in ourselves, we are gaining knowledge - the
same knowledge, in fact, that the master chess player is gaining,
all points of the world-hologram are the same.

for
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Any situation in which a human being finds himself is potentially
a source of knowledge, including those situations which require the
use of language.

The point is not so much that language is "bad"

but that it is a mistake to equate any verbal statement with knowl¬
edge.

For knowledge is a process, a feeling, an experience which may

or may not involve the use of language.

And the same kind of argument

applies to language as a communicator of knowledge.

If you, reader,

are living in the words you are reading, then I have communicated
knowledge tc you in the sense of having provided the context for an
act of knowledge.

Somewhat more intensely, if I am living in as I

write and you are living in as you read,
least vicariously.

then we are communicating, at

And more intensely still, if you and I ever have a

conversation (verbal or non-verbal) wherein we live in each other,
then we are communicating indeed.

Once again, communication cannot

be equated with the words used or even the lack thereof.

Rather, it

is an act, a feeling, an experience which may or may not employ
language.
Besides providing opportunities for living in, words can also
have the function of leading people toward the experience of knowledge.
A verbal tract like this one might, for example, be the goad which
eventually leads some reader to experience an act of knowledge which
he might otherwise not have experienced.

Far more likely,

the lengthy

and profound consideration of some verbal puzzle might lead to such an
experience.

Clearly, such is the intent of the Zen Koan.

If one can

immerse oneself deeply enough in the consideration of such a question
as "What is the sound of one hand clapping?" one might well lose one’s
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self and thereby experience knowledge.

Similarly, I would claim, the

deep reflection on any verbal statement or on any word can achieve
the same end.

If the reader has the forebearance to think lengthily

about any question or any word he thereby opens himself to the
possibility of discarding his self, seeing through the words, and
experiencing knowledge.
But consideration of language and its functions, as well as of
differences in language from culture to culture, also supplies an
avenue for supporting the notion of the world-hologram.

In addition

to the large intra-cultural differences in language structure, there
are systematic and significant differences in the structure of
languages of different cultures.

And, as Benjamin Lee Whorf long ago

pointed out, the structure of a cultureTs language to some extent
determines the way in which the world is seen in that culture.

It

simply makes no sense to ask which language is a more valid represen¬
tation of the world.

The world is irrepresentable in language, and

any language which arbitrarily divides it into categories can be made
to ’'work” as well as any other.

Unless one is willing to tolerate the

notion that some languages are "better" than others as describers of
the "real" world, one must begin to make room for the notion that
there is an undifferentiated world out there which can be "handled"
by an infinite number of languages.
Consider the by now classic example of Eskimo words for snow.
There are well over half-a-dozen different words for snow in the Eskimo
language, each of which refers to a different kind of snow.

The

21

distinctions made by those words are ones which we who use English
customarily overlook.

We simply do not slice that "part" of the world

up as systematically as do Eskimoes.

Similarly, there are realms of

time distinctions and social-class—politeness distinctions in the
Japanese language which we have never even considered making.

We do

not slice the world up that way, and part of the reason is that our
language provides no avenues for doing so.

It does not force us to

make some distinctions which Japanese does force on its users.
the question of "Which language is
one.

Now,

’right'?" is obviously an absurd

The different languages represent rather drastically different

modes of categorizing the world and, since there are no "natural"
categories in the world, none of the languages are ultimately "right",
all are equally in error by virtue of having made the same mistake,
and all can serve the valuable functions of communicating and leading
toward acts of knowledge that I have described above.
There will be those who would claim that the spectacular rise of
science in modem times represents the attainment of a "universal
language" and thereby a valid set of categories for describing the
universe.
do, indeed,

And it is quite clear that modern, technological societies
look to Science for answers to questions regarding the

"real" nature of the world.

The important point is that when one looks

at the process of science carefully, as we shall do in the succeeding
chapter, one finds that the nice, neat category systems,

the theories

of the universe, and the carefully designed models are as arbitrary
and ultimately indefensible as any other attempt to slice the world into
parts.

22

Despite widespread difference, Twentieth Century philosophers of
science tend to agree on one crucial point:
can never be either complete or certain,

that scientific knowledge

Some would argue that knowl¬

edge of reality is at best probabilistic;^ some would argue that
scientific models are at best abstractions which can be more or less
useful, but never known to be true,

and some would argue that the

degree of personal commitment involved in knowledge of any kind makes
"objective'' knowledge impossible.6

Poincare,7 as far back as the begin¬

ning of this century, has proved to his satisfaction (and to that of
many others) that the total realm of existing "facts" concerning the
world at any time, can always be explained by an infinite number of
theories.

That is, the "universe of experience" which any man or man¬

kind has on hand at any time, can be sliced up, explained, and
accounted for in an infinite number of ways.

No surprise if the world

is the undifferentiated hologram I have been describing.

g
In a somewhat more sophisticated manner, Tarski

has developed a

similar proof:
In a logical demonstration closely akin to the proof of
Godel's theorems, Tarski has shown that any formal system in
which we could assert a sentence and also reflect on the
truth of its assertion must be self-contradictory.
Thus, in
particular, the assertion that any theorem of a given formal
language is true, can be made onl^ by a sentence that is
meaningless within that language.
To put the conclusion more simply, if I say "That is a book" and
then say "It is true that that is a book," I have contradictec myself
(see Tarski's proof, if you desire a good deal of rigor),

And if I
i

say "That is a book" and then wish to reflect on the truth of that
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statement, I can only do so in a language that has no meaning in
En?3-i.sh.

A vicious bind for one who would describe the secrets of

the universe via language.

A commonplace for one who feels the

undifferentiatedness of the world-hologram.
In a sense,

then, I would take these descriptions of the difficul¬

ties of science and the varieties of language across cultures as
evidence for the world-hologram ontology.

But, at the same time, I

must caution the reader against taking the word "evidence" too serious¬
ly within my framework.

Language and the canons of logic are not

grounds for evidence in. such a world.

If categorization is misleading,

then self-contradiction is no more so and, in fact, might be less so.
From my framex^ork, the statement "Black is white" makes as much sense,
if not more so,

than the statement "black is black."

Evidence, within

my scheme, must always be experience, feeling - an act of knowledge.
Ultimately,

"evidence" for the ontology which I have presented

can only lie in the personal experience of individuals.

I would, in

fact, urge the reader to survey his personal experiences for instances
of what I have been calling "living in."

I would be surprised if many

readers could find examples of "loss-of-self" experiences in their
lives that approach the intensity of those cited in Chapter I.

I would

be equally surprised, hox^ever, if any reader failed to find such
experiences in his life on a less grandiose scale.
Extreme proficiency at any skill would provide opportunities for
knowledge experiences as I have defined them.

Driving a car,

participation in sports, craftsmanship, artistic creation, scientific
insight (the experience, not the later verbalization), dancing, musical
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performance - any act which so absorbs the actor that he no longer
exists as an actor.

But "living in" can occur passively,

too.

Gazing

at a sunset can be an act of knowledge insofar as the observer is
thereby divested of his self—hood,

Reading a book or poem, listening

to music, watching a dramatic performance, looking at a work of art
or of nature - all can be acts of knowledge if and only if the
observer is not separated from the observed.

If he lives in it,

experiences himself as it, i£ it.
To document the occurrence of such experiences in the history of
mankind seems to me an unnecessary endeavour at this point.

William

James and others have done it for religious experiences.^
R.D. Laing,

11

experiences.

Bert Kaplan
John Dewey,

for aesthetics.
Watts,

17

D.T.

13

and others have done it for "psychopathic"
Susan Langer,

14

and others have done it

Alfred North Whitehead,^ Jean Paul Sartre,^ Alan

Suzuki

Michael Polanyi,

12

19

18

and others have done it for philosophy.
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Alan Taton,

done it for science.

Arthur Koestler,

And Susan Langer,
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and many others have

Arthur Koestler,
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and

others have done it for everything in their attempts to tie all
creativity and knowledge

(artistic, scientific, dramatic, literary,

humorous, etc.) under one rubric.
has been thoroughly documented.
discussed, analyzed, and argued.

The existence of such experiences
Their "meaning" has been frequently
Conviction, commitment, and knowl¬

edge of the world-hologram can only come through the reader, not
from external verbiage.

What we think is less than what we know;
What we know is less than what we love;
What we love is so much less than what there is;
And to that precise extent we are so much less than
what we are.
Or, if you prefer:
There is no way to step off the treadmill.
It is all treadmill.
Your move, reader.

CHAPTER

III

The real world has become so fantastic that satire...
is discouraged because reality outdistances it.
The dispassionate intellect, the open mind, the
unprejudiced observer, exist in an exact sense only in a
sort of intellectualist folk-lore,,..

It would be difficult, if not impossible, to over—emphasize the
influence which the Scientific Revolution has had upon the life and
thinking of Western Man.

To be sure, such influences (and especially

this particular one) are reciprocal and I have no desire to argue
over chicken-and-the-egg questions here.

However one looks at it,

popular notions of the scientific process and its philosophy seem to
me to be excellent indicators, in the Western world, of the popular
Weltanschauung.

The common man’s philosophy of science tends to be

his philosophy of the universe, because we all tend to see Science as
the most legitimate approach to Truth.
I need to talk at some length about Philosophy of Science,

then,

because of its importance as a barometer of popular philsophy.
Furthermore, this chapter on Science will serve as a bridge between
the more general philosophy described in the preceding chapters and
the highly specific psychological models described in subsequent
chapters.
If Western Man is a realist in his basic view of the world, he
is a super-realist in his perspective on Science,

When we talk about

the high points in the history of science, we speak of "discoveries,
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Scientists report their "findings" in journals.
science is data (i.e.

The basic "stuff" of

"things given") which are better the more they

are untouched by human hands and minds.

Laws and experiments are more

valid the more objective they are — i.e.

the less they reflect the

commitment and biases of human beings.

The laws, harmonies, and order

of the physical universe are "out there" waiting for us to discover
them, and we are most likely to do so if we can strip away our biases
and preconceptions.

Science does not impose order on a chaotic

universe, it searches for the system which is already there, however
deeply and mysteriously hidden.
Let us look at some classic examples of this view of science
which I claim to be the currently predominate one.

Galileo rolled some

balls down some inclined planes.

He measured the distance the balls

moved in various time intervals.

The measurements were made with as

exacting care as could be in those days.

Galileo then looked at those

’’data", computed the acceleration of the balls down the planes, and
thereby discovered the Law of Falling Bodies

2

(s=l/2gt ).

The "Law"

virtually sprang forth at him from the objective data,
Johannes Kepler, having spent years immersed in a storehouse of
accurate data on the movements of planets,

finally sees his Three Laws.

The data, accumulated over many years by many people (particularly
Tycho Brahe) who were relatively unbiased and therefore objective,
forced Kepler to come to the conclusions

that he eventually arrived at.

The three laws of planetary motion were, if you will, embedded in the
data, awaiting the keen insight of a man like Kepler to discover them.
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Robert Boyle, perhaps the most objective data-gatherer that
science has ever seen, discovered Boyle’s Law by inspecting some
accurate data regarding air in a j-tube.

The unbiased organization

of those data revealed the fact that pressure and volume of a gas vary
systematically with one another.

It required the careful, unbiased

talents of a Boyle to gather data which were sufficiently uncontami¬
nated to arrive at the measurements of pressure and volume which
revealed Boyle's Law.
Gregor Mendel spent the major portion of his life raising flowers
systematically cross-fertilizing them, and carefully recording the
attributes of the resulting off-spring.

Over a period of years, the

data showed certain regularities and systematic relationships between
the traits of off-spring and the traits of ancestors.

Upon inspecting

these masses of results, Mendell discovered his basic Laws of Genetics
Kekule,

the father of organic carbon-ring chemistry, arrived at

the conclusion that the benzene molecule has a ring structure through
careful analysis of detailed data regarding the chemical properties
of benzene.

Experiments with benzene, comparisons of its chemical

properties and behavior with that of other straight-line organic
compounds, convinced Kekule that benzene could not possibly be such a
molecule and that it had to be structured like a ring in order for if
to behave as the data showed that it does.
We could go on, but, after all, enough is enough.

I shuuld,

perhaps, apologize for setting up such a straw man, but I'm not sure
that I have done so.
science

I know of too many 19th century philosophers of

(and of history and a few other things,

for that matter) who
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argued in precisely such a vein.

I know of too many social scientists

in the Twentieth Century who see their science in such a light.

And

I know of too many non-scientists who see all of science as such an
objective process of discovery,
a strawman.

to be able to dismiss the argument as

If the view of science implied in the above historical

accounts seems incredibly naive and weak to the reader, it is not be¬
cause no one has that view.

It might, in fact, be wise for the reader

to stop at this point and analyze his reactions to those paragraphs.
Do the descriptions seem plausible?
science as you tend to view it?

Do they represent the process of

If not, where do they fall short?

In order to describe the process of science in what I consider to
be a more accurate light and spirit, let me recount the "discoveries"
I have mentioned above in a somewhat different manner.

Galileo,

upon inspecting a series of fairly inaccurate measurements of balls
rolling down inclined planes, manipulated them so as to produce a
systematic, harmonious relationship.

The shere harmony, beauty, and

simplicity of that relationship, and the number series it produced,
convinced Galileo that his equations were correct.

Galileo was

intuitively certain of his equation and felt a strong personal commit¬
ment to it.

He then proceeded to conduct a host of experiments with

balls rolling down inclined planes

(and his heart as a time piece!).

Although the "data" were sloppy and thus far from, in themselves,
confirming nis conclusions, he considered them to be close enough to
what he knew, intuitively, was right to consider them as evidence for
his conclusions:
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Here we have a typical example of Galileo’s method in
physics:
Imagine the conditions of a given situation,
make a mathematical formulation and derive the reasonable
consequences, then make a rough check, if it seems necessary,
to be sure that the result is correct.
...In 'experiments
near an hundred times repeated,’ Galileo found that the
times agreed with the law, with no differences ’worth
mentioning.
His conclusion that the differences were not
worth mentioning only shows how firmly he had made up his
mind beforehand, for the rough conditions of the experiment
would never have yielded an exact law.
Actually, the
discrepancies were so great that a contemporary worker, Pere
Mersenne could not reproduce the results described by Galileo
and even doubted that he had ever made the experiment.^
In his DIALOGUE ON THE TWO GREAT SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD, Galileo
has one of his characters ask whether he had made an experiment on a
given point, to which Galileo responds:
No, and I do not need it, as without any experience I can
affirm that it is so, because it cannot be otherwise.^
Kepler, immersing himself for years in detailed observations of
planetary motion and, in particular, a small discrepancy in the orbit
of Mars, had what can best be described as a "religious conversion"
or "flash of insight" which convinced him irrevocably that the Earth
was not the center of the universe, and that his Three Laws of
Planetary Motion were True.

Kepler's belief in his three laws was

particular confirmed to him by the fact that they provided a framework
within which complete harmony and geometric unity could be seen in
the universe via a system of regular geometric solids progressing outwards from the Sun.

Thus confirmed in his views, Kepler spent well

over three years monkeying with the data on Mars in order to get it to
fit into his scheme of things.
and all seemed well.

Eventually, of course, he succeeded

But it is at least somewhat ironic to note that

Kepler was a terrible mathematician, and was saved in his calculations
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only by the fact that his arithmetic errors cancelled each other out.
When one runs Kepler's original data through a computer, one gets
very nearly the same results as Kepler achieved, but one also finds
he made thousands of arithmetic errors which happened to cancel
each other out.

In any case, Kepler "knew he was right" long before

he turned to the data for confirmation.
Boyle is an even more interesting case.

He was, indeed, one of

the most "objective" data-gatherer's that science has ever seen.

In

fact, he spent the major portion of his life gathering and recording
data in minute detail - most of which has never been used, and never
will be since it relates to no theory that anybody cares about at the
moment.

4

Boyle conducted his J-tube experiments in order to disprove

one of the going theories about nature's abhorrence of a vacuum, and
having done so he characteristically stored away in a closet all his
detailed observations on the levels of mercury in the tube.

It took

one of Boyle's assistants, considerably more theoretically inclined
than he and much' interested in the then current notions of atmospheric
pressure, to weed through those j-tube data, organize them in a
highly abstract way, and invent the system of equations that could
come close to making them all fit.

Boyle was, if you will, far too

"objective" to be able to invent Boyle's Law.
Mendel is, perhaps, one of the best examples of science taking
its own realism too seriously.

Mendel's data in support of his laws

of genetics are, to put it bluntly, much too well in agreement with
his theory to have been "real".

Replication of Mendel's experiments
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has always shown a much larger spread of data, and though general
agreement with the Laws still pertains the fit is never anywhere near
as close as Mendel claims to have gotten.5

What seems to have

happened is that Mendel's personal commitment to the laws was so
intense that he manipulated his data quite substantially in order to
show extremely close agreement with his theory.

The moral for

scientists is fairly clear - if you’re going to fudge your data to
make the theory you believe in look good, don’t make it look too good
or it will look bad,
Kekule’s descriptions of the process whereby he arrived at his
benzene ring hypothesis are among the most honest and revealing
documents in the history of science,

Kekule did immerse himself deep¬

ly in the data on benzene and was dissatisfied with current explana¬
tions of the structure of that compound, but the data did not give him
any guide as to what that structure might be.

The guide and

inspiration, and the conviction in his ideas, came from his dreams.
I turned my chair to the fire and dozed. .. .Again the
atoms were gambolling before my eyes, This time the smaller
groups kept modestly in the background, My mental eye, rendered
more acute by repeated visions of this kind, could now
distinguish larger structures, of manifold conformation; long
rows, sometimes more closely fitted together; all twining and
twisting in snakelike motion.
But look!
What was that?
One
of the snakes has seized hold of its tail, and the form
whirled mockingly before my eyes.
As if by a fl^ash of light¬
ning I awoke...Let us learn to dream, gentlemen.
Kekule’s certainty came from a dream, not from his data.
The process of science, as I am describing it, is a far more
personal enterprise than we commonly believe.

And the traditional

arguments that science gains its values through its

objectivity

or
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"usefulness” or "predictive value" seem to me to be little more than
smokescreens which obscure the intensity of the scientists'
ment to his work.
coverer,

commit¬

The scientist is, after all, a creator, not a dis¬

Galileo's laws of falling bodies, Kepler's Three Laws of

Planetary Motion, Boyle's Law, Mendel's Laws of Genetics, and Kekule's
benzene-ring model are creations which can be, and have been, imposed
on a universe which is sublimely indifferent to systematization.

The

- value of those creations, and the commitment to their validity, has
its origins in the creative act of the scientist, in his feeling of
commitment, in his flash of insight or "Eureka" experience.
can no more be "objective" than any other human enterprise,

Science
for it

rests on the personal values, biases, and feelings of those who engage
in science.

And, in a very real sense, the entire super-structure of

science is little more than rationalization and extension of the
collective biases of scientists who see the world through similar sets
of rose-colored glasses.
The argument will be made, as it has been so frequently in the
Twentieth Century,

that the validity of a scientific theory resides

in its utility, its ability to predict future events.

A theory which

gives accurate predictions is "probably true" and one which does not
is "probably false,"

But the simple-mindedness of that explanation

leaves all too much out of the scientific picture.

If, for example,

vt believe scientific theories on the basis of their accurate predictions, then why have we bought Einstein's General Theory of Relativity
in the complete absense of confirmation of his three predictions?
And why have Miller's experiments, replications of the Michelson-
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Morley experiment which contradict the Special Theory of Relativity,
been relegated to oblivion?7

Even more importantly, what do we do

with Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle which, in essence, claims
that we can never predict accurately?
The images of Science as Predictability and Utility are little
more than extensions of our wish to believe in the objectivity of
science.

We like to think that theories, admittedly developed by men,

are capable of proving themselves wrong or right with virtually no
interference from human bias.
is true, if not it is false.

If a theory’s predictions bear out, it
But we continually neglect in such neat

formulations the crucial element of human conviction and commitment.
To a large extent, the theories of Galileo or Mendel or Einstein have
led to successful predictions because we believed in them.

If we are

looking for answers that confirm a theory, we will find them, and if

g
we are not, we will not.

When we believe in a theory, we accept

sloppy data that confirm it easily, and we work hard to reject tight
data that discorifirm it.

This is not to say that data are totally

irrelevant to Science, but it is to say that data is much less relevant
to the convictions of individual scientists than we like to believe.
The irony of the situation is that the individual scientist is far less
liekly to be convinced by data than is the non-scientist.

The

scientist is persuaded by his dreams, his insights, his convictions,
end his visions.

The laymen is convinced by words and numbers he

doesn’t understand, but which carry the weight of the scientist s
personal conviction shrouded in what has, for us, become a Holy Lang-

uage.

9
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The reader who finds my arguments against predictability and
-utility as the basis of scientific validity to be intriguing but
unsatisfactory would do well to inspect Michael Polanyi’s PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE,

Polanyi’s treatment of these matters is considerably more

systematic and well-documented than anything I could do here, and his
conclusions are essentially the same as mine on this point.

The

scientist constantly reassures himself and his public that he won't
believe anything until he sees it whereas, in fact, he won’t see
anything until he believes it,

If, in science, to see is to believe,

than it is at least as much the case that to believe is to see.
If we confront a scientist (or anyone else,

for that matter)

with that nasty little question that five-year-olds are always asking,
’’why?", we will inevitably drive him to the same fundamental basis of
his theorizing:

"Because!”

Though we would always like to think

there is more, the rock on which our beliefs and theories about the
universe must always be founded is our own, intensely personal commit¬
ment to the perspectives, ideals , and values that we hold,
Relativistic as this stance toward the process of science may be,
it is crucial to keep in mind that I in no way intend to belittle the
value of scientific endeavour.

Whenever one tries to argue that the

foundation of what human beings believe is their belief itself - their
emotional attachment and commitment - one always finds that people
react by coiiduding that all endeavour based on such weak, personal
" premises is worthless.

But such is not the case, at least in my view:

"It is one thing to say that ’values are only relative.’
Quite another to remove the pejorative adverb and assert
’There are relative values!
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To claim that science is worthless because it rests only on the
biases and emotions of scientists is, in my estimation, to grossly
misplace one's emphasis and grossly devalue the so-called "affective"
aspects of human beings,

The crucial, valuable thing about science,

as about all human endeavour (see Chapter I), is that experience of
commitment and involvement which is denied value by the statement
"Values are only relative."
The value of science lies in its "Moments of Truth" as Arthur
Koestler has called them.

They are the "Eureka" experiences, the

flashes of insight, the "great" discoveries which shake the ages and
leave masses of work for technicians who wish to "prove" the validity
of what the discoverer already knows.

These intuitive experiences

are what scientists, and human beings in general, live for.

They are

acts of knowledge as I have described them elsewhere, and the
verbalizations of science are little more than attempts to communicate
those experiences and lead others to have similar ones.

Compare the

following descriptions of scientists at the moment of truth, with
Chapter I’s descriptions and anecdotal accounts of mystical experiences.
There is, I claim, no detectable difference:
Just at this time I left for Caen, where I was then
living, to go on a geological excursion under the auspices
of the school of mines.
The changes of travel made me
forget my mathematic work.
Having reached Countances, we
entered an omnibus to go some place or another.
At the
moment when I put my foot on the step the idea came to me,
without anything in my former thoughts seeming to have
paved the way for it, that the transformations I had used
to define the Fuschian functions were identical with those
of non-Euclidean geometry.
I did not verify the idea; I
should not have had time, as, upon taking my seat in the

37

omnibus , X went on with a conversation already commenced,
BUT I FELT A PERFECT CERTAINTY,
(Henri Poincare)
One phenomenon is certain and I can vouch for its
absolute certainty:
the sudden and immediate appearance
of a solution at the very moment of sudden awakening.
On
being very abruptly awakened by an external noise, a
solution long searched for appeared to me at once without
the slightest instant of reflection on my part - the fact
was remarkable enough to have struck me unforgettably - and
in a quite different direction from any of those which I
had previously tried to follow.
(Jacques Hadamard)
On April 27, 1802, I gave a shout of joy...It was seven
years ago I proposed to myself a problem which I have not
been able to solve directly, but for which I had found by
chance a solution, and knew that it wcs correct, without
being able to prove it.
The matter often returned to my mind
and I had sought twenty times unsuccessfully for this
solution.
For some days I had carried the idea about with
me continually.
At last, I DO NOT KNOW HOW, I found it...
(Andre Marie Ampere)
At last two days ago I succeeded, not by dint of pain¬
ful effort but so to speak by the grace of God.
As a
sudden flash of light, the enigma was solved.... For my part
I am unable to name the nature of the thread which connected
what I previously knew with that which made my success
possible.
(Karl Friedrich Gauss)
I took part in the wine harvest.
I watched the wine
flowing, and going back from the effect to the cause, I
studied the power of this press which nothing can resist....
A simple substitution which is a ray of light,...To work
then'.
God has revealed to me the secret that I demanded of
Him..,.

(Johannes Guttenberg)

It is in the highest degree astonishing to see what a
large number of general theorems, the methodical deduction
of which requires the highest powers of mathematical analysis,
he (Faraday) found by a kind of intuition, with the security
of instinct, without the help of a single mathematical formula,
(von Helmholtz)
The words or the language, as they are written or
spoken, do not seem to play any role in my mechanism of
thought.
The physical entities which seem to serve as elements
in thought are certain signs and more or less clear images
which can be ’voluntarily’ reproduced and combined..,,
Taken from a psychological viewpoint, this combinatory plau
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seems to be the essential feature in productive thought before there is any connection with logical construction in
words or other kinds of signs which can be communicated to
others.
(Albert Einstein)
'I see everywhere in the world the inevitable expression
of the concept of infinity.
It establishes in the depths
of our hearts a belief in the supematureal.
The idea of God
is nothing more than one form of the idea of infinity.
So
long as the mystery of the infinite weighs on the human mind,
so long will temples be raised to the cult of the infinite,
whether God be called Brahmah, Allah, Jehovah or Jesus.,,The
Greeks understood the mysterious power of the hidden side of
things.
They bequeathed to us one of the most beautiful words
in our language—the word ’enthusiasm’—en the os—a god within.
The grandeur of human actions is measured by the inspiration
from which they spring.
Happy is he who bears a god within—
an ideal of beauty and who obeys it, an ideal of art, of
science.
All are lighted by reflection from the infinite.’
(Louis Pasteur)
...I maintain that cosmic religiousness is the strongest
and most noble driving force of scientific research.
Only
the man who can conceive the gigantic effort and above all
the devotion, without which original scientific thought cannot
succeed, can measure the strength of the feeling from which
alone such work... can grow.
What a deep belief in the
intelligence of creation and what longing for understanding,
even if only a meagre reflection in the revealed intelligence
of this world, must have flourished in Kepler and Newton,
enabling them as lonely men to unravel over years of work the
mechanism of celestial mechanics .... Only the man who devotes
his life to such goals has a living conception of what inspired
these men and gave them strength to remain steadfast in their
aims in spite of countless failures.
It is cosmic religious¬
ness that bestows such strength.
A contemporary has said, not
unrightly, that the serious research scholar in our generally
materialistic age is the only deeply religious human being.
(Albert Einstein)
I must, before I die, find some means of saying the
essential thing which is in me, which I have not yet said, a
thing which is neither love nor hate nor pity nor scorn but
the very breath of life, shining and coming from afar, which
will link into human life the immensity, the frightening,
wondrous and implacable forces of the non-human,
(Bertrand
Russell)
The most beautiful and most profound emotion we can
experience is the sensation of the mystical.
It is the sower
of all true science.
He to whom this emotion is a stranger,
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who can no longer stand rapt in awe, is as good as dead.
That
deeply emotional conviction of the presence of a superior
reasoning power, which is revealed in the incomprehensible
universe, forms my idea of God.
(Albert Einstein)
Tue sublimation of the self-transcending emotions has
transformed 'magic* into 'science'; but there is no hardand-fast boundary between the two,
Unconscious, pre-rational,
®agical
thinking enters both into the creative act and into
the beliefs or superstitions of the scientist. .. .Not only
Kepler's astronomy was derived from belief in the Holy Trinity
and the Harmony of the Spheres; most of the giants of science
were similarly inspired by religious, mystical or transcendental
beliefs,
(Arthur Koestler)
I could go on and on with such anecdotes and descriptions, but
the point should have been made.

The crucial incidents in science are

acts of knowledge, self-transcending experiences, acts of "living in."
The verbalizations are, at best, secondary.

Personal commitment,

emotional attachment, and irrationality are the cornerstones of
science as they are of all significant human endeavour.

Indeed, I

should note that Arthur Koestler in his brilliant THE ACT OF CREATION,
has done an excellent job of documenting and explaining such notions
for the fields of humor, the arts, and science.

The creative act is

the act of transcending one’s self, of discarding old category schemes,
of combining frames of reference (Koestler calls them 'matrices')
into wholes that were previously separated artificially,

Science,

like all other areas of human life, is a perfectly adequate means for
living in, but its value lies in personal commitment and transcendence,
not in its systematic verbalization.

CHAPTER

IV

Psychology first lost its soul, then its mind, then
consciousness ; but strangely enough, it still behaves!

In the previous chapter I have tried to persuade the reader that
science ultimately rests on the personal commitment of scientists to
their theories, biases, and perspectives.

A large number of current

scientists and philosophers of science, especially in the more "exact"
sciences like quantum mechanics and high energy physics, would concur
with some such description.
ed, not found.

They would agree that theories are creat¬

That man imposes order on the universe with varying

degrees of satisfaction.

That Scientific Laws do not spring forth full

blown from the head of Data,

That the essence of science and its

value to both individual scientists and the world does not lie in its
systematic massing of reams of facts.
But the so-called "Social Sciences", and psychology in particular,
still gain their philosophical nourishment from philosophies of science
which prevailed in physics at least 50 years ago, and have since long
died their natural deaths.

The modern day psychologist, by and large,

perceives his science in the kind of naive realistic manner that the
natural scientist has long since abandoned as hopeless,
example,

Consider, for

the following quotations from B,F, Skinner’s SCIENCE AND

HUMAN BEHAVIOR:
Science is more than the mere description of events as
they occur,
It is an attempt to discover order, to show
that certain eyents stand in lawful relations to other
events.

(p.6)
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Science is first of all a set of attitudes.
It is a
disposition to deal with the facts rather than with what
someone has said about them. ... Science is a willingness to
accept facts even when they are opposed to wishes.
Thought¬
ful men have perhaps always known that we are likely to see
things as we want to see them instead of as they are, but
thanks to Sigmund Freud we are today much more clearly aware
of 'wishful thinking.'
The opposite of wishful thinking is
intellectual honesty - an extremely important possession of
the successful scientist.
(p.12)
Science is, of course, more than a set of attitudes.
It is a search for order, for uniformities, for lawful rela¬
tions among the events in nature.
(p.13)
The notion of science implied by the above quotations, and all
the more so by the major thrust of Behaviorism, is one which derives
quite directly from Percy W. Bridgman's "operationism,

In reaction

to the revolution which Einstein initiated in modern physics, and in
accord with the more general outlook of the logical positivists
(especially Ayer'* and Carnap^) Bridgman proposed a naively realistic
philosophy of science which he believed would forever protect Science
from Einsteinian catastrophe's.

The essence of operationism was that

all concepts mean no more than their strictly empirical descriptions:
In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a
set of operations.... if we have more than one set of operations,
we have more than one concept.
Operationism in the "hard" sciences died almost at the instant
that it was born with scientists in a variety of fields stressing what
Bridgman ignored - the total dependence of operations and concepts on
theory.

As Einstein wrote, in reply to Bridgman:

In order to be able to consider a logical system as physical
theory it is not necessary to demand that all its assertions
be independently interpreted and 'tested' 'operationally ;
de facto this has never yet been achieved by any theory and can¬
not at all be achieved.
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Why were the natural sciences so quick to reject operationism?
-Because it is self—contradictory and, equally important (as Einstein
reflects above) a naively inaccurate view of what scientists have
done.

Consider, for a moment, an operational approach to the concept

"length."
How would we go about measuring a length, even approximate¬
ly? We would take a yardstick and put it down next to the
object measured, and see how many times we can lay it end to
end - forgetting for the moment about fractions of yards.
But
which yardstick?
There is an official meterstick in Paris,
but it is very precious , and never used.
What we do is
measure off another stick of the same length, and use it.
But
how do we know that this will give us the same answer? How do
we know that it makes no difference what material it is made
of and by what route it is carried to the object to be measured?
The answer is that we consult our theories to see whether
these factors influence the length; we are told that the route
traveled makes no difference, but the material it is made of
may influence the measurement, for example, in very hot
weather.
But this is a vicious circle!
We are trying to define
length; in applying this definition we must apply theories
which make use of the concept of length, which is yet to be
defined.
How do we know what the theories mean until we know
what length is ,^and how do we know what length is until we have
these theories?
To put the argument in Polanyi’s terms, we need a subsidiary
awareness of a whole body of theory in order to define length.

And

we need a subsidiary awareness of length in order to build bodies of
theory which employ that concept.

Operationism denied the intuition

and commitment to theory upon which science rests, and so was rejected
in short order.
But the behavioral sciences
swallowed Bridgman hook,

(with Watson

line, and sinker.

8

taking the initiative)

Rejecting the much more

9
sophisticated views toward science of psychologists like Freud

(,a

keenly astutue philosopher of science), the behaviorist tradition

A3

gained its major foundations from a still-born philosophy of science.
The rebirth of behaviorism with its empirical, approach to human life;
search

for the laws governing human behavior; with its

insistence upon behavioral definitions for such concepts as "mind"
and

emotion ; and with its rejection of any meaning in such concepts

unless they can be defined behaviorally amounts to little more than
an attempt to revive a fictitious past,

If psychology is a science,

or is ever to become one, it will find its grounding in the same
elements of intuition, commitment to theory, and subsidiary awareness
that support other scientific endeavours.
The irony of the situation is that, although behaviorism presumes
to be purely atheoretical, empirical, and "objective" it is, by
human necessity, bound up in the same processes of theory-building,
bias, and commitment that it renounces in other breeds of psychology.
After all, how does one know what a "behavior" is except by some body
of theory or conceptual structure which gives that category meaning?
As I have argued- elsewhere, the mere use of language constitutes a
commitment to ways of dividing the world which are arbitrary but
which guide our very thoughts and actions.

The only psychology that

could ever be free of theory, bias, and commitment would be the
totally silent psychology, and behaviorism is certainly not that!
Kekule’s recommendation is one which psychologists would do well
to consider:
;—

-"Let us learn~to dream, gentlemen!"
i

The psychological theories described in the following chapters
are verbalizations of dreams,

They represent the kind of speculation

and commitment which must ultimately become the basis of psychology in
any humanly scientific

form.

Furthermore, they represent beginning

points for accomplishing a major task which all psychologies must
heed, but which few even recognize as a problem:

Psychology, as a

science, must be grounded in some substantial body of philosophy.
But psychology deals with human beings, and human beings are the
producers of both philosophy and psychology.

Thus, psychological

theory must account for itself and for the philosophy on which it is
based.
The physicist can be content to ground his theories in contem¬
porary philosophies of science and then proceed to follow his
intuition as it leads him with no need to introspect on how that
theory applies to itself, to himself, or to the philosophy on which it
is based.

But the psychologist's theories must do more.

help in explaining the psychologist to himself.
in explaining how they,

themselves, arose.

They must

They must be of use

And they must simultane¬

ously support and be supported by a philosophy of science,

To use

Polanyi’s framework again, an adequate phychological theory must rely
on subsidiary awareness as support for its focal awareness, but it
must also be able to account for that which it relies on and must even
account for the subsidiary-focal relationship,
No small task, that, but it is precisely the direction in which
the theories to be described attempt to move.

They begin by assuming

the philosophical bases which have already been discussed:

science

as commitment, intuition, subsidiary awareness, living-in,

The theo¬

ries are based on the legitimacy of personally held theory — they
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derive their ultimate validity from my commitment to them, and from
that of those others who share that commitment.

At the same time,

the theories help to explain the manners in which we slice up the
world arbitrarily; the ways in which focal awareness becomes sub¬
sidiary awareness; the ways in which living in is possible as a human
experience and the necessity for human beings

(including me as

psychological theorist) to rely on committed-to words and theories in
their attempts to categorize the uncategorized.
Some more words about words seems necessary at this point.

The

philosophy of science I have described and the psychological theories
I will describe are all founded in language, conceptual schemes, the
slicing up of the "world-hologram,"

Yet, I am committed to that

philosophy and those theories in the same manner as I am committed to
the notion of an unverbalizeable world,

Contradiction?

Perhaps, but

if so it is to be expected in a world which language can only describe
arbitrarily.

The theories which I propose are arbitrary and decep¬

tive as are all verbalizations.

They do, however, carry my personal

conviction, plus confirmation through evidence which I will describe,
plus the personal convictions of several noted psychologists.

And,

most importantly, they succeed in doing what few psychologies have
attempted - explaining themselves.
Lest the reader get lost in the technicalities which follow, let
me describe the general structure of the subsequent chapters.

—y

Chapter

proposes a theory of schizophrenia and attempts to explain thereby

how mystical experiences and extreme cases of "living in" are possible.
Chapter VI deals with some general and specific considerations

.
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of human processing of sensory input.

The intent here is to document

the notion that human beings impose order upon the universe, even at
such basic and primitive levels as visual perception.

Chapter VII

builds on the specifics of Chapter VI and begins to set forth a
general model of "learning", where I mean by learning the development
of systematic ways of categorizing, slicing-up the world.

By the time

he reaches Chapter VIII, the reader will find himself out of the trees
and ready to see the forest, for it is at that point that I shall
begin to tie both philosophical and psychological considerations
explicitly to the main focus of this document:
learning.

student-directed

CHAPTER

V

I want you to remember that in the present state of our
society, the patient is right, and you are wrong,

The descriptions of the schizophrenic experience already mention¬
ed in Chapter I, and the central place which such mystical experiences
have in that chapter, make the psychology of schizophrenia an excellent
jumping-off place.

Most of the elements of the general learning

theory to be described in Chapter VII will appear somewhere in this
chapter.

But my intent here is not to develop the learning theory.

Rather, it is to convince the reader that a substantial body of
^psychology and physiology can be brought behind H.S, Sullivan’s state¬
ment above.

In the terms that I used in Chapter I, the schizophrenic

experience is one of "living in", of feeling the world in its "real",
undifferentiated state.

This chapter attempts to explain how it is

that such living in experiences can occur, and how it is that they
frequently lead their experiencers to become what we classify as
s chizoph renic.
The label "schizophrenic” is usually applied in the following
four categories to people who exhibit the associated behavior
patterns:
CL)

Simple Schizophrenic:

Usually develops in the early
teens and is typified by extreme
_apathy to the environment.

(2)

Hebephrenic:

Also develops early and slowly. _The
^
person exhibits very active but "absurd
behavior - unexplained laughing,
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bizarre word associations, degenerate
behavior (e.g, eating dirt).
(3)

Paranoid.

(4)

Catatonic:

Onset is usually quite sudden in early to
middle adulthood.
The patient has
delusions - systematized beliefs about
the world not shared by the rest of
humanity - and hallucinations,
Onset is usually quite sudden.
The patient
is seemingly unresponsive to the world
and displays unusual outbursts of behavior
(e.g, attacks or assaults, or very rigid
walking, curling up in a ball, etc,)

Needless to say, the kinds of behavior that will suffice to get a
person labeled as officially schizophrenic differ quite widely from
one another.

The important question in all such cases is that of

deciding between what is the Primary disorder, and what is Secondary.
Is the paranoid's systematic delusion an adaptive response to some
other problem, or is the delusion at the core of the problem itself
If a person limps when he has a broken leg, we quite easily classify
the limp as a secondary disorder - an adaptive and sensible response
to the primary disorder, a broken, leg,

If a person is subject to

frequent catatonic fits, are the fits secondary or primary disorders?
If secondary,

then what are the fits a response to?

In a nutshell, the theory of schizophrenia which I wish to pro¬
pose sees all of the symptoms described above as secondary, adaptive
reactions to a much more basic "problem".
person who,

The schizophrenic is the

for one reason or another, has mo re accurate perceptions

of the "real" world than the rest of us.

Perception of the world, as

we "normal" people engage in it, is a complex interaction between input
from the world and our own perceptual modification of that input,

The
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schizophrenic is one who is not able to modify the input as
extensively as we do, and hence he experiences, things in ways closer
to

reality

than we do.

The symptoms of schizophrenia are simply

adaptations which the schizophrenic makes in order to cope with his
more intense perceptions, and with the fact that no one besides him¬
self seems to be experiencing those perceptions.

Most of the psycho¬

logy which I will explain in this and subsequent chapters is an
attempt to understand what it is

that we do to "reality" as it enters

our perceptors that schizophrenics do not do.
Perhaps a good start would be for us to consider what it means
to "pay attention" to something.

What we are doing when, in a crowded,

noisy room, we focus our attention on one particular voice?

The most

likely answer is that we are tuning everything else besides that one
voice out.

We pay attention to the voice by ignoring everything be¬

sides the voice.

To a large extent,

-rather than a positive, matter.

focusing attention is a negative,

There is abundant psychological

evidence for such -a conception of attention, most of it stemming from
the work of people like Moruzzi

2

and French

ation" (about which more later), Malmo
cal learning theorists

4

3

on the "reticular form-

on activation, and the classi¬

(e.g. Hull)"* on inhibition.

Most interestingly, some of the physiological mechanisms of this
process of attention through selection have been worked out, and they
bear directlv on the problems of schizophrenics.

What seems to happen

- -is that the reticular formation "(a structure Tn the mid-brain) serves
the double role of activating the cortex as a whole (i.e.

tuning it up,

preparing it to receive stimuli) and at the same time damping down all
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inputs except the ones to which a person is attending.

It is this

latter function of inhibitting incoming stimuli that is of most
interest for our purposes.

The nerve mechanisms whereby this kind of

inhibition occurs have also been studied to some extent, and also
provide some helpful clues to the world of the schizophrenic.

Most of

the nerve fibers which inhibit input are '’cholinergic" - a particular
class of autonomic nerves which gets its name from one of the chemicals
involved in the transmission of nerve impulses from one nerve to
another.

When a cholinergic nerve "fires", the impulse is in part

transmitted by the chemical acetylcholine, secreted well in excess of
what is necessary to trigger the next nerve in line.

But once the

nerve has fired, two other chemicals are released (cholinesterase and
serotonin)

to absorb the extra acetylcholine and thus return the first

nerve to normalcy.

If the cholinesterase and serotonin were not there,

the cholinergic nerves would have a much lower threshhold than they
usually do - i,e.

they would fire with much less prodding.

If an

excess of either'cholinesterase or serotonin exists, the nerves will
have a much higher threshhold - i.e. it will take much more prodding
to fire them.
Now, what seems to be happening in "normal" human beings is that
a certain range of incoming stimuli from the world is sufficiently
strong to register with our sense organs, but not sufficiently strong
to activate the cholinergic-inhibitory system.

These are the stimuli

that we are paying attention to at any given point in time,

But, at

the same time, in most human beings the threshhold of the nerves in
the inhibitory system of the reticular formation is sufficiently low
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(i.e. we have little enough cholinesterase and serotonin)

that we

are able to block out a good deal of the incoming world.

Our screen¬

ing system, if you will, is sufficiently sensitive to prevent a large
part of the world from even registering our attentions,

thus enabling

us to deal with the world systematically, a piece at a time,

What,

then, given this maze of chemicals and nerve systems involved in
attention through selection, might be different about the schizophren¬
ic?

The strongest possibility, backed by several lines of research,

seems to be that the schizophrenic is troubled by an abnormality in
his use or production of serotonin.

In particular, the schizophrenic

in early stages seems to have a relative abundance of serotonin at
his cholinergic nerve seems to have a relative abundance of serotonin
at his cholinergic nerve sites, hence the threshhold of his inhibition
system is high, hence he is relatively incapable of screening out
sensory inputs from the world.
The evidence for this fairly specific hypothesis comes from all
sorts of scattered places and levels, and it would take volumes to
reproduce it all here, but some of it can be stated at least in general
terms.

Several physiologists have attempted to make assays of the

relative amounts of serotonin in normal people as compared with
schizophrenics

(a mightily difficult procedure).

Though this work is

far from conclusive due to its complexity, the evidence of such re¬
searchers as Toderick, Wooley-Shaw, and Marazzi would suggest that
schizophrenics may, in fact, have an excess of serotonin at their

,

cholinergic nerve sites.

6
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Another block of evidence for the hypothesis comes from the
extensive psychological and physiological work which has been per¬
formed using LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide).

Psychologically, LSD

produces perceptions and behaviors which are very closely parallel to
schizophrenia.

In particular, the hallucinations, the feelings of

being bombarded by extra-intense sensory input which is not systemat¬
ized and controlled as it normally is, and even the strange behavior
patterns are closely parallel to those of schizophrenics in the early
stages of the ’’disease,”

Physiologically, the effects of LSD, though

still subject to much conjecture, may be even more relevant.
best current guess

The

(again based on the work of people like Wooley-Shaw,

Zeller, and Ditman) is that LSD performs the same function at
cholinergic nerve sites as serotonin - i.e, it absorbs excess
acetylcholine,

thereby raising the threshhold of cholinergic nerves

and interfering with a person's ability to screen out sensory inputs,
LSD, by blocking the activity of cholinergic nerves, by preventing a
person from screening out sensory inputs that he "normally” screens
out, produces many of the characteristics of acute schizophrenia,7
The third block of evidence comes from a wide variety of sources
focused on the process of learning, reinforcement, and inhibition,
particularly as those processes are related to the reticular formation
of the brain.

The evidence here is far more extensive and complicated

than in other areas, but is basically just an extension of the notion
of attention as inhibition of the unwanted,

Beginning with learning

theories like that of Hull and with investigations of arousal and
activation, one can build an argument about learning as a process of
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inhibittmg 'incorrect” responses, just as we are looking at attention
as inhibition of unwanted stimuli.

With learning viewed in this

light, we would predict that a schizophrenic, or a normal person or
animal whose cholinergic activity has been blocked by administration
of a drug, would have greater difficulty in simple learning experi¬
ments

than a

normal” person.

With his cholinergic activity blocked,

the person would be unable to inhibit incorrect responses and would
tend to continue making errors because he was not able to block them.
Evidence that such is, in fact, the case has been obtained by Hearst,
Carleton, Krech and Rosenzweig in studies of the
cholinergic activity upon animal learning

8

tffects of drugs and

and by people like Howe,

9
Venables, and Wing in studies of schizophrenics.
Before summarizing all of these disparate findings into a total
picture of the schizophrenic experience, I must turn to one other
aspect of the whole problem.

In addition to the four classifications

of a schizophrenic behavior described at the beginning of this chapter,
there is a fundamental distinction between "acute” and "chronic”
schizophrenics.

The acute schizophrenic is the patient

in the early

stages of the "disease", whose perceptions and behavior have become
strange, and who may therefore have been committed to an institution.
The chronic schizophrenic is the patient who has spent many years in
an institution and whose behavior has long since settled into some
unusual rut - usually characterized by extreme inactivity and unrespon¬
siveness.

Acute schizophrenics who are committed to institutions

frequently

(though not always) become chronic as the years go by.

Some acute schizophrenics

(about 20 per cent - a figure which has_ not
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changed since about 1920, despite all the varied efforts to design
treatments and therapies) return to normalcy at some point,

All

chronic schizophrenics were at some point in the early stages of the
"disease" in the acute stage.
The distinction between acute and chronic has considerably more
significance for the theory of schizophrenia that I am proposing than
do the four categories mentioned earlier,

The four categories

represent, to me, different behavior patterns which schizophrenics
adopt in order to live with and explain to themselves their unusual
perceptions.

The acute-chronic distinction, however, has a fairly

substantial physiological meaning.

The acute schizophrenic is the one

who is bombarded by sensory input because his screening mechanisms
are not functioning — i,e, his cholinergic nerve activity is hampered.
This means two things in the light of the double function of the
reticular system:

(1)

the acute schizophrenic does not screen inputs

very effectively and is hence bombarded by his environment;

(2)

the

acute schizophrenic is at a relatively low level of arousal or
activation due to a low level of reticular stimulation of the cortex
in general.
The chronic schizophrenic, on the other hand, is physiologically
quite the opposite.

His level of arousal and activation is abnormally

-high and his screening activity is exceptionally effective,

Thus,

whereas the acute schizophrenic does not screen out as much input as
we do,

the chronic screens out far more than we do.

These extreme

differences in the physiology of acutes and chronics have been fairly
well documented by such researchers as Shagass and Hall, and are.
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exceptionally well illustrated by the different reactions of acutes
and chronics to administration of small doses of tranquilizers.

If

such drugs are administered to acute schizophrenics, their symptoms
and abnormalities are greatly worsened,

But if administered to

chronic schizophrenics, even though they are outwardly very passive,
the tranquilizers lead to some improvement and lessening of
abnormalities.
What seems to be happening when tranquilizers are given to the
two groups?

When administered to acutes, the drugs increase the

problem by lowering an already low level of arousal and by further
hampering the patient’s ability to screen out environmental input,
But when given to chronics, the drugs lower a level of arousal which
is too high,

and prevent the patient from screening out as much as he

does, thus bringing him closer to the levels of arousal and "screening"
that we typically are at.
The general picture of schizophrenia which emerges from the
preceding discussion is somewhat as follows.

For reasons yet to be

determined, some people develop a physiological problem involving
their use or production of serotonin.

This problem results in their

being at relatively low levels of arousal (and hence, easily aroused)
and makes them unable to screen out the sensory inputs which they have
been screening out all their lives.

They begin to experience sensa¬

tions which the people around them are not experiencing (see THE INNER
WORLD OF MENTAL ILLNESS) - brighter colors, louder sounds, generally
unsystematized and uncategorized perceptions.
having these experiences, and since they,

Since no one else is

themselves, have never had
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them before, they b,egin to develop rationalizations of their new
sensations and behavior patterns that will help them cope with them.
They might believe that they are being persecuted by "someone" or
everyone, or that they have been singled out as special by God
(Paranoid) ...

They might find the sensations too much to bear and

consciously tune out their environment through extreme apathy
(simple).

They might simply "flow" with their new sensations and thus

exhibit behavior which is strange to the rest of us - e.g. laughing
for no good (to us)

reason, strange word associations

(hebephrenic).

They might exhibit extremely violent bursts of behavior due to their
excitability or might adopt a rigid posture, including very slow walk¬
ing, in order to prevent their kaleidoscopic sensations

from becoming

overwhelming by their changing so quickly (catatonic).
In any case, the behaviors which we focus on to categorize them
as "sick" are quite natural reactions to a rather drastic change in
their perceptual world.

They feel like they are "made of hollow glass"

because of their extremely intense sensory experiences, and they cope
with those experiences in ways that we find to be unusual.

So we

commit them to an institution which by virtue of its being intensely
stimulus free, helps them to shift from the
stage.
rate,

acute stage to the chronic

Thus, with sensations coming in at a rapid and uncontrolled
they adopt the defense of trying to shut out as much of the

incoming world as they possibly can so that they can cope with their
world.

And we help them shut the world out by placing them in

institutions that do a let of the shutting out for them (e.g. plain
white rooms).

Slowly, the acutes become chronic as their state of
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arousal increases and they are able to shut out more and more of the
external world.

Finally, they and we, have succeeded in shutting out

so much that they are faced with a new problem, in a new inner world,
that they are rarely, if ever, able to escape from — hallucinations.
Whereas the acute schizophrenic is placed in the difficult
position of dealing with genuine, but very new and intense, sensations,
the chronic schizophrenic is faced with a world of hallucinations that
are quite literally produced from within.

The hallucinatory world of

the chronic is undoubtedly quite similar to (and arises for the same
reasons as) the well-documented hallucinatory world of people
participating in sensory deprivation experiments,^^

In conditions

where sensory input is severely limited, human beings seem to fill
their minds with assortments of material stored over the years in
their brains.

Thus, the sleeping person dreams; the person in a

sensory deprivation chamber hallucinates; and the chronic schizophrenic
is confined (by himself and a mental institution) to a hallucinatory
world.
This description of schizophrenia bears quite directly on much of
the philosophy which I have already propounded and on much of the
psychology which is soon to be discussed,

I am claiming that, just as

the descriptions of schizophrenic experience may describe the world in
a more "real" manner that our schematized descriptions, so there is a
sizeable body of psychological evidence which helps account for the
difference between' normal and schizophrenic perceptions.

In particular,

the evidence does indicate that the acute schizophrenic’s perceptions
are more real than ours in the sense that they are more complete., less
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actively screened and modified by the perceiver.

It is only through

our labeling of the schizophrenic as mentally "sick", and through
the schizophrenic’s own sense of strangeness, inadequacy, and disease,
that the acute, who lives in the world more fully than we, comes to
defend himself by closing out the world and creating his own
hallucinatory version of reality - i.e, becomes a chronic schizophrenic,
usually for the rest of his life.
Furthermore, we have begun to discuss the ways in which we,
by contrast with the acute schizophrenic, process and screen the infor¬
mation which comes to our senses from the world.
looked briefly at one of the mechanisms

We have, thus far,

(the reticular formation)

whereby we actively block out sensory input and prevent it from
registering on our minds.

It is to a more detailed consideration of

these processes of sensory control, modification, and screening that I
wish now to turn.

The schizophrenic, as I have described him, is the

person who is particularly able to head Camus' dictum:
Open yourself to the benign indifference of the universe
Let us inspect the ways in which we close ourselves, keep the
world out, and fail to "live in",

CHAPTER

VI

-Seeing is believing

Believing is seeing

tfost of us regard the eye as one of the most passive receptors
which we possess.

To be sure, we are aware that the eye does not pick

up all the frequencies of light that surround us, but we tend to
believe that what our eyes do see arrives at our brains in fairly
undistorted fashion,

We consider the eye to be a window to the world,

letting what is out there come in so that we may behold it.
Until recently, psychology has, in fact, regarded virtually all
sensory perception in some such light.

The old theories of the

"reflex arc" and of stimulus-response psychology in general were pre¬
dicated on the belief that the nervous system (excluding the brain)
serves two separate functions:
activating muscles.

letting pure information in, and

Until recently,

the afferent (carrying messages to

the brain) and efferent (carrying messages from the brain) nervous
systems were thought to be quite separate except for their connections
at the brain and spinal column.
Recent work in neurophysiology has pretty much destroyed these
notions.

Experiments involving virtually every mode of sense perception

have demonstrated that the afferent—efferent distinction is not as
clean as we liked to believe.

What has been found, in general, is that

some 10-30 per cent of our afferent nerve fibers carry messages _to the
sense organs, thereby exerting active control over what is perceived
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and how it is perceived.

General statements of and evidence regarding

this view can be found in the work of such people as Kuffler, Hunt,1
Hagbarth, Kerr,

Galambos,

Pribram, Spinelli,

Sperry,5 and Weiss.6

I wish, in this chapter, to deal with the more specific problem of
afferent control of perception in the eye as a model of such control
3.11 other perceptors and as a model of the process of learning (see
Chapter VII),

The eye is, after all, an ideal case for study since

the retina is little more than a group of migrated brain cells:
sense, at least,

in this

the eye is_ a window to the brain.

First, a few words must be said about the structure of the retina.
Rather than being a single layer of rods and cones which are sensitive
to light,

the retina consists of at least four layers of nerve cells,

the last of which (i,e, farthest from the entering light) is made up of
the light-sensitive rods and cones.

The other three layers

(amacrines,

bipolars, and ganglion cells) are highly relevant to the following
discussions for they appear to be the ones that play an active part in
interpreting, coding, and distorting information before it is passed on
to the brain, ^

The messages that are sent from the eye to the brain are

not "pure" reflections from light sensitive cells, but interpreted,
coded versions of that input.
One of the ways in which the retinal cells code visual information
is through what is known as '’lateral inhibition" - probably a function
of the amacrine cells.

The physiological and behavioral aspects of

lateral inhibition have been investigated fairly thoroughly for the

8
senses of sight, hearing, and touch by such researchers as Hartlme,
Hubei,9 Ratleff,10 and Eccles.11

In the case of the eye, what seems to
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happen is that the activity of a rod or cone inhibits the activity of
its neighbors.

Thus, when a receptor fires due to light shining on

it depresses the firing of its neighbors.

The stronger the light,

and the closer the neighbor, the stronger the effect of the inhibition.
Ihis effect of each rod and cone on its neighbors seems to be achieved
through the amacrine cells which laterally connect the receptors with
one another.
The effects of lateral inhibition on information coming into the
eye are crucial both to our ability to perceive and to my discussion.
The mutual inhibition of neighbor by neighbor serves to increase the
amount of contrast in the visual material entering the eye.

And a

striking example of the way in which contrast is increased by lateral
inhibition is found in the phenomenon called "Mach Bands" named after
the physicist Ernst Mach who first investigated them extensively,

12

If a human being looks at a piece of paper which is graded smoothly and
continuously from light to dark,
perfectly continuous.

13

he will not see the gradation as

Rather, he will see a light band in the light

area and a dark band in the dark area so that the change in darkness
" " appears to be "bumpy" rather than smooth.

These light and dark bands,

which are produced by the observer's eye through lateral inhibition,
are Mach Bands.

It is literally impossible for a human being not to

see Mach Bands, and yet they are not "really" there - they are produced
by the retina.

Furthermore, it is the same mechanism which produces

Mach Bands that enables us to perceive contrast at all.

Were it not

for lateral inhibition we would not be able to perceive the contrasts
(bright-dark, loud-soft, hard-soft) that we "find" in the outside world
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In addition to lateral inhibition which helps us perceive contrast,
there are other things going on in the retina which also alter the
visual information coming in from the outside.

One of these phenomena

is known as adaptation or "self-inhibition" and is typified by the
obvious processes of "getting used to" a dark room or colored sun
glasses.

Until very recently it was thought that adaptation was

merely related to bleaching of pigments in the rods and cones
(receptors) of the retina.

But recent work involving Electro-Retino-

grams, and an interesting experiment by Ratleff indicate that such is
not the case.

Ratleff*s experiments involved the production of a

stabilized image on the subject's retina through the use of mirrors
(including one mounted on the white part of the eye) and an electronic
device which corrects for eye movements.

1A

The apparatus causes a slit

of light to be shined into the eye such that it continues to fall on
the same receptors, regardless of the person's eye movements. With the
light always falling on the same rods and cones, it is perceived ac¬
curately for a few seconds, but then it disappears.
seconds,

After a few

the person no longer sees the light at all.

What seems to happen is that the bipolar cells of the retina act
as a feedback loop and if the light on a given receptor cell is not
changing, it is erased within a few seconds.

This phenomenon of

inhibition" is, once again, not isolated to the sense of sight.

self-1
If,

for example, the reader will place the eraser of a pencil on the back
of his hand and hold it perfectly still, he will find that after a few
i
seconds he can no longer feel its presence.

The sense receptors respond

to the change (a new light or a pencil on the back of the hand) but
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then, unless things change again, they erase themselves and are thus
prepared for whatever else might come their way.
Let us stop here and build a somewhat abstract model of perception
which builds on and extrapolates these notions of lateral and self
inhibition.

Sensory information from "outside" is coded into some sort

of message through the process of lateral inhibition.

The information

is , in a sense, stereotyped by this process - contrasts are exaggerated
and "distinguishing" features are highlighted so that the input may be
coded (categorized) and passed along the line.

The receptor is then

erased by the process of. self-inhibition so that it is ready to process
the next input that comes along.

As we proceed up the neural hierarchy,

these same two processes continue to operate, all the way up to the
cortex.

That is, each stage adds further coding, categorizing, and

processing and then erases itself to await new input.

Further evidence

seems to indicate that the ways in which the incoming information is
coded depends on a whole life-time of active experiences, and it is to
this evidence that I now wish to turn.
The evidence begins with a simple experiment first described by
“Helmholtz which the reader could perform on himself.

Close one eye,

and then with your fingers push the other eye around.

What you will

see is that the whole perceptual field seems to bounce around - i.e.
move in the direction that you move your eyeball.

But if you were to

move your eyh in the same way with your eye muscles
finger)

the world'would not appear to be moving.

to

(rather than your

And yet the pattern

of light which falls on the retina in the two cases is exactly the same
The traditional explanation of this phenomenon is one that employs
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an analogy and we shall start with it in the hopes that the analogy
can be made a bit more concrete.

Consider the eye as a projector and

the retina (or, perhaps, the visual cortex) as a screen on which
images can be shown.

Normally, when we move our eyes with our eye

muscles, we simultaneously "move" the screen so that the world does
not appear to move.

In the above experiment, the projector is moved,

but the screen is not, hence the sensation of the world bouncing
around.

Landsteiner added a good deal of credence to this analogy by

performing the converse experiment upon himself - moving the screen
without moving the eye.

He paralyzed (temporarily) his eye muscles

and then tried to move his eyes.

Obviously, his eyes did not move,

but the world appeared to move around - i.e. he moved the screen with¬
out moving the projector.
Further evidence indicates that, in order for a person to
construct such a "screen" which moves in harmony with one's projector,
one myst be active rather than merely passive in receiving stimuli.
Several experiments have been performed wherein the subject wears
prism glasses which flip his visual world upside down.

If the subject

is allowed to move around and be active, the world flips itself back to
right-side-up within two weeks - i.e.
down to match the projector.

the screen turns itself upside

Similarly, Richard Held has performed

experiments on kittens wherein some of them walk under their own power
and others are pulled in a gondola, but all are exposed for tue same
length of time to the same visual patterns.

The active cats learned to

discriminate the patterns, the passive ones did not.
Teuber, Pribram,15 and Bruner16 have referred to this process of
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preparing the screen" as corollary discharge or, more popularly, a
feed-forward-mechanism."

The basic notion is that when we are about

to perceive through a particular sensory mode, we pre-set the percep¬
tual process in anticipation of the perceptions.

Our perceptions and

actions then change the "screen" on which our next perceptions will
be seen and we prepare the new screen for the next round of perceptions.
Needless to say, this analogizing is somewhat speculative, but the
experiments cited above plus some of the work of Pribram on the visual
cortex of the monkey do suggest that some such feed-forward-mechanism,
influenced by past actions, is crucial to the way in which we
perceive."^

The juicy question is, of course, what is the "screen" on

which our perceptions are seen and which is pre-set to accommodate all
our incoming sensory data?
For a possible answer let us return to my original description of
holographic photography.

The combination of a reference beam of light

and light bouncing from objects produces interference patterns on a
photographic plate.

These interference patterns can then be illuminated

so as to reproduce a three-dimensional picture of the object.

The

picture produced is the same regardless of how small or large a piece
of the hologram is illuminated.

Interestingly enough, there is mounting

evidence that the sensory processes of the human being as I have been
describing them in this chapter operate in much the same way as a
hologram.^
Jacques Loeb and Lashley have suggested that interference patterns
in the brain account for perceptions.

Bearle, Gray Walter, and Lilley

have produced evidence that interference patterns do exist and can be

66

shown by proper tapping of cortical activity.

And Norton and Galambos

have produced a piece of evidence which makes the hologram analogy seem
well worth persuing:

they have found that removal of up to 98 per cent

of a cat’s optic nerve fibers does not interfere with the cat’s ability
to perform at pattern discrimination tasks.
With so much for accumulated bits and pieces of evidence, let me
try to describe in broad outline the model of perception-screening that
emerges from a consideration of the hologram analogy.

At any particu¬

lar "level" of the perceptual process, from retina to visual cortex,
the process of lateral inhibition serves to

accentuate and abstract

incoming information, coding it into a more "usuable" (and less accurate)
form, then passing it on to the next level and wiping itself clean
(self inhibition)

to receive the next input.

Furthermore, at each

level of the process the incoming nerve impulses interact with the en¬
tire sum of spontaneous nerve activity that is already going on.

Thus,

the incoming data is comparable to the "object beam" in holography, and
the existing neural activity is what we have called the "screen" the "reference beam" in holography.

Every perception,

then, is an inter¬

ference pattern produced by the combination of large-scale neural "waves"
from outside and inside.
Thus, for example, at the retina, interference patterns are formed
by the nerve activity stimulated by incoming light mixing with the
’’reference beam”

(i,e.

the sum of perceptions stored up until that time).

This interference pattern is passed on to the visual cortex thus chang¬
ing the screen (reference beam) and the retina is then prepared for new
input (i.e.

the new version of the screen, modified by the last per-
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ception, is fed forward to serve as
put),

the reference beam for the next in¬

The "screen" we have been talking about is the "reference beam"

and it is constantly being changed since it is no more than the "sum"
of all the effects of neural interference patterns which a person
has experienced.
How is the "screen" stored?

That is, how do the effects of all

our perceptions come to have a more-or-less permanent effect on our
mode of perception in the future?
physiology of memory

This is not the place to go into the

(for the reader who is interested, D.P. Kimble’s

THE ANATOMY OF MEMORY is an interesting start).
of Hyden,

19

Krech, Rosenzweig, Bennett, Diamond,

But the recent work
20

and Pribram

21

would

suggest that the two factors of RNA-induced protein formation and
actual growth of nerve fibers are involved in both rewiring and chang¬
ing the "resistance" of neural pathways.

These two processes could

account for changes in the entire cortical circuit being produced by
new sensations

(i.e. interference patterns) - and the changes in the

circuit would, in effect, be what we call "memory".

That is, each

perception influences the ways in which future experiences will be had
by changing the cortical circuit.
change is

The degree of permanence in that

the degree of permanence of the memory of the perception.

Pfy concern, however, is not closely related to memory and its
physiology, a subject which has relevance in its own light.

Whatever

theory of memory turns out to be most popular, and however many

stages

it has between short-and long-term, it will, in my terms, be accounting
for the way in which incoming perceptions influence future perceptions.
I have tried, in this chapter, to show the many ways in which incoming
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perceptions are modified by our past experiences, stored as they are in
the neural patterns of our brains.

Every experience we have is coded,

even at such primitive levels as the retina.

The information which

reaches our "minds" is not "the same" as that which impinged on our
eyeballs.

It is abstracted, categorized and filtered in ways that

we are never conscious of but which are part of our very physiology.
Furthermore, every such categorized perception influences the
way in which future perceptions will be categorized.

By the time a

person has reached my age (and, indeed, well before) he has, in
effect, built into his head an entire world of categories and systems
which filter, screen, and abstract his perceptions into familiar boxes.
The perceptions "themselves" do not come wrapped tightly by Nature in
such boxes, but we develop the boxes ourselves, in our heads.

I have

claimed that these filtering and screening mechanisms operate at all
levels of the neural process, and I wish now to turn to a higher
level:

that of "learning" in general.

I will mean by "learning" the

development of categories, systems, schemes for relating perceptions
and experiences to one another, and I will develop a model which is
based, in its mechanics, on the processes that we have already seen:
lateral and self inhibition.
describes

In essence, it is a model which

the way in which we build the "screen" on which all of our

perceptions are "shown,”

Thus, it is a model of the way in which we

see what we believe, rather than believing what we see,

CHAPTER

VII

The ancient subject matter of psychology - the mind and
its various manifestations - is distressingly invisible, and
a science with invisible content is likely to become an
invisible science.

The model of learning which forms the basis of this chapter is
little more than an extrapolation of the notions set forth in Chapter
VI.

I am concerned here with what the "screen" is on which all our

-experiences and perceptions are based, and I am concerned with the ways
in which the screen gets changed by our experiences.

To put it as

briefly as possible, I will argue that human beings,

throughout the

course of their lives, develop internal representations of their
personal universes.

They will, if you wish, build internal models,

maps, pictures of what the world is like.
have been talking about)

These maps

(the screens I

then provide the framework within which all

of their experiences occur,

Learning as we traditionally view it

(i,e, new concepts, theories, facts, etc.) is nothing more than the
process of adding to, subtracting from, or changing one’s internal
map of the universe,

"Living in" as I have described it is the exper¬

ience that one has when his perceptions are not filtered, channeled,
and explained by his internal map,
—But let me use a simple example to become more clear about what
an internal "map" is.

When you first move to a new town, it is

virtually impossible to navigate without some form of external aid.

To

get from your house to your office and back you will have to rely on a
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city map, written directions, or possibly a memorized set of instruc¬
tions Saving you street names, landmarks , distances , and the proper
bums in their proper places.

After a while, of course, you no longer

need to rely on anything external,
the landmarks

You know where to turn, and all

that signal places to turn, slow down, avoid bumps, watch

for traffic, etc,, are virtually automatic for you.

In my terns, you

have internalized a "map" of the route from home to work and back,

I

certainly do not claim that this "map" is anything like a road map.
Rather, it is a very detailed representation of your perceptions as
you drive from home to work.

The more frequently you drive the same

route, the more familiar it becomes - the more of its detail do you
incorporate into your mental picture of the universe.

Most import¬

antly, your internal representation of that route from home to work
is your expectation of what you will perceive next time you drive.

It

is, if you will, the detailed screen on which your future perceptions
are based.

Usually,

this creates no "problems" - the route is always

the same as your internal picture says it should be.
the internal map’s predictions are wrong.
(or, better still, go back to visit an old,

One day you drive the route
familiar

haven't seen for quite a while) and you ' feel
but you can't quite put your finger on it,

But, occasionally,

place that you

that something is funny,

Your attention is riveted

to some part of what there is to see, and you keep staring at it with¬
out quite knowing why.

And then you realize it:

that house used to

be grey, not green; or that fence has just been painted; or a tree that
used to be there was cut down,...

After the route has become very

familiar, we expect it to be the way our internal map says it is,- and

71
if it is different in the slightest detail, we pay attention to that
slight difference.
I begin, then, with the notion that people build internal models
of the world - that these models dictate what people perceive while at
the same time being changed by what people perceive - and that these
models are a guide and framework for action.

The problem of a really

comprehensive psychology would be to "describe how actions are control¬
led by an organism’s internal representation of its universe" as
Hiller, Galanter, and Pribram have begun to try to do.*'

The problem

of concern to me here is a more detailed analysis of those internal
representations and how they get built.
The most helpful evidence regarding the general nature of our
internal maps and the general mechanism we have for changing them comes
from the work of recent Russian psychologists
the "orienting response".

2

(particularly Sokolov) on

The orienting response itself is nothing

new to psychology, having been first pointed out by Pavlov
experimented with extensively since then.
basically a "startle" response.

3

and

The orienting response is

It is a reaction to novelty, surprise,

and involves turning toward the unexpected stimulus plus a whole range
of physiological reactions

(changes in heart rate, pupil dilation, skin

conductance, etc.) which signal that an organism is

paying attention

(as in Chapter V - high level of arousal and much input being screened
out) .
The work of Sokolov in the late 1950’s provides the key to learn¬
ing as changes in the internal map.

Sokolov placed dogs in a room,

allowed them to get accustomed to it, and then introduced a new
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stimulus
tone.

(e,g,

a tone).

The dogs would, as expected, orient to the

Upon repeated presentation of the tone, the dogs would no longer

orient to it - again, an expected and thoroughly documented process
(known as "habituation"),
tone in any way,

Sokolov then found that if he changed the

the dogs would orient to it again, until it was re¬

peated several times in its "new" form, when they would habituate
again.

If the tone were made louder or softer, higher or lower, the

dogs would orient to it again,
duration (e.g,

If the tone were made shorter in

1/2 second instead of one second) the dogs would orient

to the unanticipated silence.
This final experiment, orienting toward unexpected silence, brings
to mind a story which might well fix the "orienting response" in the
reader's mind.

Several years ago, the city of New York was forced to

stop running its 63rd Street "L" (trains on suspended tracks) in order
to do some work on the tracks.

During the two weeks that the

trains

were not running, the police station received a large number of phone
calls at 2 a.m.
normally run.

and 3 a.m.

from the neighborhood in which the trains

The callers would complain of burglars, but burglars

were never to be found and nothing was ever missing.

People would call

in and claim to have been awakened in the middle of the night by unusual
sounds.

They could never describe the sounds, or even recall hearing

them, but they had been awakened from a sound sleep by something.

What

was happening was that the 63rd Street L, which had become part of
these people's internal map, part of their expectations of what happens
every night at 2 a.m,

and 3 a.m, , was not there,

Their waking up in the

middle of the night was an orienting response to the unexpected silence
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caused by the absence of a train that was normally there,

The "63rd

Street L effect" was merely a powerful example of the orienting re¬
sponse.
The two processes described above - orienting and habituation represent the core of learning,

When there is a discrepancy between a

person’s internal representation of the world and the world as he per¬
ceives it, the person orients toward the source of that discrepancy i,e. he pays attention to it.

Having "registered" the anomaly for a

sufficient period of time, he has succeeded in building it into his
internal map, and hence he no longer pays attention to it - the "novel"
is no longer "novel" - habituation (learning) has occured.
The most lucid and economical model of what seems to be going on
in the orienting response and habituation derives from the work of
Hiller, Galanter, and Pribram in their general attempt to relate cog¬
nition and behavior.

The model is based on a hierarchy of what they call

"TOTE's":

To oversimplify their conception a bit, what happens is that
perceptual data enter the "mind" and are immediately tested against
predictions from a person's cognitive map.

If the entering information

is consistent with those predictions, then no difficulties are en¬
countered and the organism proceeds on to its next activity or to the
processing of the next bit of information from the world.

But if- there

is a discrepancy between the input and expectations, if the "Test"
reveals an incongruity, then the organism perforins some "operations"
to remove the incongruity.

When the Test stage finally reveals the

successful handling of the difficulty, the organism can move on to
other matters.
These TOTE’s are analogous to thermostats which test the temper¬
ature in a room and, if they find it different than their setting would
"expect", perform some operation (turn a heater on or off) until the
difference is rectified.

The orienting response as a model for learning

suggests that such thermostats exist in a hierarchical manner (i.e. with
thermostats regulating other thermostats)
through the cortex.
thermostats

from perceptual organs all

The settings and changes in settings on the

(the "test"

phase of a TOTE) are learning as I have defined

it - changes in a person’s internal representation of the world.
The picture of learning which emerges from these considerations is
one which fits nicely with both the ontology developed earlier and the
theories of perception discussed in the last chapter.

It is a picture

of human beings developing their capacity for imposing structure and
order on a chaotic world by building structured screening apparatus.
Our perceptions are comparisons of the world as it comes in through our
filters with a stored accumulation of categories and expectations.
When the two fail to mesh, we begin to change our screening mechanisms
slightly, so chat the new and unexpected becomes "familiar" ii. the
sense that it "fits" a perceptual box which we have made for it,
i

The conception of a cognitive map as the "screen" on which our
experiences are shown - as filter of our experiences and at the same
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time subject to change due to experience - can be illuminated in some¬
what greater detail by refering once again to the work of Miller,
Galanter and Pribram.

In conjunction with their "TOTE" model, they

posit the existence of two different kinds of structures within our
cognitive maps, "Plans" and "Images".

"A Plan is any hierarchical

process in the organism that can control the order in which a sequence
of operations is to be performed."

"The Image is all the accumulated,

organized knowledge that the organism has about itself and its world."
Thus,

the "operate" boxes in our TOTE’s are primarily built up of Plans,

and the "test" boxes are. made of Images.

The world, as it comes in

through our screening processes, is constantly compared with Images values, goals,

facts, theories of the universe - which define our

expectations of what the world ought to be.

Our Plans summarize the

ways in which we can deal with that input, be it consistent with our
expectations or incongruous.
Perhaps some examples of Plans, Images, and their inter¬
relationships would be useful.

A football quarterback has, in his

repertoire, a whole series of executable Plans that he can call on at
will.

The Plans range in complexity from such simple things as stand¬

ing, walking, and running to more complex sequences like a particular
hand-off to a halfback or a series of fakes and a long pass.

The Plans

have been learned - i.e. built into the map as sequences that the
quarterback can execute if he decides to - but the decision as to which
Plan comes into play when is made with reference to Images.
too, differ in their complexity.

The Images,

They range from simple "fact"-Images

involving the quarterback’s knowledge of the shape and feel of a foot-
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ball, his perception of the line-markers on the field, colors on his
teammates’ jerseys, etc.

to much more complex "valueimages.

These

latter, which range in complexity from the value of "winning this game"
to that of "completing this pass play for a first down" or "leading
the league in pass completions this year so I’ll be worth more next
year",

form the complex web around which decisions will be made.

On

the basis of the information coming in from the world and the in¬
congruities which that information creates in comparison with the
quarterback’s entire set of Images, he will decide at each point in
the game what plans to execute at what time.

The process is, of course,

an exceedingly complex one, with Plans and Images hierarchically organ¬
ized in terms of their importance and dependance on one another.
of the Plans are consciously decided upon (e.g.

Some

a pass play now in¬

stead of a run) and some are automatically called upon to facilitate
others

(e.g,

receiving the ball from center and fading back to pass).

Similarly, some of the Images are consciously referred to (e.g. which
is more important the first down now or the chance at a touchdown via
a long pass?) and others are referred to automatically (e.g. the
players on my team wear white jerseys).
Complex though these considerations may be, it would appear that
virtually all of human behavior can be accounted for in terms of such
a scheme.

Furthermore, there are some general principles regarding

Plans and Images which ease the task of accounting for learning and
behavior.

First, Images change only when there is either a discrepancy

between Images and the input from the world or between more than one
Image,

If one of the quarterback's teammates is wearing a black jersey,
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or if the official rules of the game are changed, or if the field
conditions are unusual, this input from the outside will modify the
quarterback's Images.

Or, if some of the quarterback's Images conflict

with one another — e.g,

the value of winning the game dictates one

Plan but that of leading the league in pass completions dictates
another - then the Images and their hierarchical arrangement will
change to remove the conflict.
Second, the execution of Plans is always subservient to some Image
or set of Images,

The quarterback's Images of what the world is like

will always dictate the way in which his actions are called upon, and
his value-images will always dictate which Plans are called upon at
what times.

Furthermore, Images dictate the ways in which new Plans

will be learned.

If the quarterback possesses a repertoire of skills

which is more than sufficient to attain all of his Images - i.e,

to

meet all of his goals and live in a world free of incongruities - then
he has no motivation to learn new Plans.

But if some of his value-

images are unattainable due to lack of sufficient Plans, or if some of
his fact-images continually raise incongruities that he cannot handle,
then he is motivated to learn new Plans

(and/or change his Images) so

as to live in a more predictable world,

As was suggested by our dis¬

cussion of the orienting response, learning only occurs when something'
goes wrong ** when the world is not as it was expected to be, or when
plans are not successful in reaching the goals that we wish to reach.
The general model of learning which I have been describing in this
chapter relates closely to the work of several psychologists in a host
of different areas.

Needless to say, none of them accept the philoso-
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phical position from which I begin, but all of them are working on
models of learning which focus on the ways in which information coming
from the outside is coded, changed, stored, and made part of some inter¬
nal representation of the world.
Jean Piaget
point.

4

The extensive developmental work of

and, more recently, of Jerome Bruner

5

is a

good case in

Though their philosophy is basically that of the realist,

their psychological work is an attempt to discover the ways in which a
child's view of the world changes over the years.

They, as I, realize

that the way in which the child actually experiences his world changes
radically over the course of his life and that the key to learning is
an investigation of the ways in which experience changes the child's
mode of experiencing.

Readers interested in some fascinating discus¬

sions of the ways in which children come to see the world as a
collection of objects, to give but one example, would do well to
consult the works of Piaget and Bruner.
Similarly, the work of a great number of what are currently
called "cognitive" psychologists bears directly on the model of learn¬
ing proposed here.

From the initial ideas of Tolman

to George Miller s

work^ on information processing to the computer simulation work of
Newell, Shaw and Simon8 - virtually all of the current cognitive
psychologists are concerned with the ways in which a person s internal
map of the world is built and with the ways in which that map affects
the person's perception of the world and behavior in the world.

I have

no desire to catalogue here the developments of these men, for I wish
to move on to a discussion of the relationship between the philosophy
and psychology already discussed.
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Before proceeding to head out of the trees and look, for the forest
again, one other perspective must be considered - that of Arthur
Koestler

9

in his brilliant THE ACT OF CREATION.

Koestler mounts a

convincing argument that creativity, whether in humor, the arts, or
the sciences, always involves the bringing together of two perspectives
(matrices as he calls them) within a single human mind that have not
been combined before,

To catalogue examples of this phenomenon would

be merely to reproduce Koestier's book, but perhaps a couple instances
would be useful,

Consider the following joke (taken from Koestier's

multitudinous, if sometimes strained, examples):
A man and his bald boss, having just finished lunch, step
outside the tavern on their way back to the office.
A passing
bird deposits its droppings on the bald man's shiny crown,
leaving his subordinate in much dismay.
"Heavens!" (or some such exclamation) he declares, "can
I do something for you? Perhaps I should get some tissue
paper?"
"Hell no," replies the boss, "the bird must be a mile
away by now,"
The humor (creativity) in the

joke

lies in the fact that, up until

the punch line, we have been considering the tissue paper from one
perspective

(a means of cleaning the boss' head) whereas the

pinch

line forces a completely different (though not, in itself, unfamiliar)
perspective on the use of the tissue paper.

It is the simultaneity of

the two perspectives, not typically brought together, which provides
the essence of creativity.
In science,

this process is, if anything, even more apparent.

The

creativity of Fleming in his discovery of penicillin resided in his
bringing a different perspective (the possibility of curing disease by
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destroying bacteria)

to a very familiar event (mold in a culture jar)

which had always been seen from quite a different perspective (a huge
annoyance to those trying to culture bacteria).

The creativity of Newton

can be found in his combination of two, until that time, widely separate
perspectives - that of falling bodies on the earth and of orbiting
bodies in the heavens.

The examples could be expanded ad infinitum,

and the reader is encouraged to return to Chapter Ill's scientific
examples from the perspective of creativity as a process of combining
previously disparate perspectives.
In terms of both the psychology and the philosophy which I have
been discussing, Koes tier's view of creativity makes eminent sense,
Psychologically, the combining of separate perspectives is, in ny terms,
a process of bringing together parts of a person's cognitive map that
had previously been quite separate.

It is the process of calling to

mind, simultaneously, two or more Images which had not been considered
together (and which may have been thought to be contradictory) and of
producing a new Image which combines the two.

It is the process of

changing one's internal representation of the world by rearranging and
combining the categories which we had previously thought to be satis¬
factory.

Philosophically, Koestler's view of creativity has, perhaps,

even more significance for me as one of many useful bridges between
psychology, philosophy, and the educational process.
considerations that I wish now to turn,

It is to such

CHAPTER

VIII

We have to deal with human reality as a being which is
what it is not and which, is not what it is.

Koestler’s model of creativity bears directly on the philosophical
notions discussed much earlier.

The creative flash arises from the

conbination of two or more perspectives which had formerly been
separated or even seen as mutually contradictory.

If the world were

as the realist would have us see it, there would be much to be wary of
in a theory of creativity based on paradox, combining of contradictions,
and the breaking of standard categories.

But if the world is

inherently contradictory, if the universe is an undifferentiated whole
which necessarily displays paradoxes when it is described in language,
then Koestler’s characterization of creativity makes eminent sense.
The argument I am searching for is considerably more detailed
than ought to go in the body of this document.

It hinges on the

difference between a world-view which accepts and expects paradox, and
one which fights furiously to avoid the contradictory.

We of the West,

being well-indoctrinated Realists, find paradox a strange and uncomfort¬
able bed-fellow.

If forced to delve into a self-contradictory statement

like the Cretian saying "All Cretians are liars," or "All generaliza¬
tions are False", we search desperately for the flaw in the statement.
Or, if we happen to be Bertrand Russell'*' and find such an irresolvable
paradox at the foundation of an entire scheme of logic, as he did1,
reconstitute the rules of logic to disallow the paradox.

then we

A world which
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obeys the rules of realism simply has no room for paradox and
contradiction.
But the realization that we live in an undifferentiated world
carries with it not only a tolerance for, but a certain amount of
relish in, contradictions.
live) in such a world.

The Japanese lives (or at least used to

For him, the two statements "This is a book"

and "This is not a book", though contradictory, could both be seen as
true at the same time.

For him, the statement "All generalizations are

false" could be both true and false at the same time without causing
any discomfort by the fact that, in either case, the statement is a
real, unavoidable paradox.
Creativity, as Koestler has described it, requires the acceptance
of such a paradox.

It requires that the creator submit to the fact

that his categorizations of the world contradict themselves, and yet
must be accepted and brought together within a single framework.

As

such, the act of creation is, for me, a small example of the kind of
mystical experiences and schizophrenic experiences that I have described
earlier.

It is one small instance of the realization that words

do not describe the world as it is; that categorization is inevit¬
ably faulty in a world that exists uncategorized.

We create, if you

will, when we destroy our preconceptions of the order and separate¬
ness of what we see as differences in the universe.

We create when we

realize that two "points" on the world-hologram are not separate as we
had formerly believed they were.

If the simple act of creation is the

pulling together of one pair of formerly separated perspectives, then
the ultimate act of creation is the mystical experience - the realiza-
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tion that all perspectives are the same, that paradox is inevitable
and integral to the verbalization of an unverbalizable universe.
Philosophically, then, Koestler's Act of Creation is a demonstra¬
tion of the kind of contradiction which is crucial to the "successful"
use of words in a world which words cannot describe.
it is,

Psychologically

as I have already mentioned, a description of one important

way in which people come to change their cognitive maps - by
simultaneously calling to mind two separated aspects of those maps.
The relationship between philosophy and psychology thus seems to be very
close on this point and, , since I claimed earlier (see Chapter IV) that
an adequate psychology must explain itself as well as its philosophy,
this would seem a good place to begin that attempt.
Let me start with the obvious.

The psychological arguments which

I have been using do not, except for the fact that they rely on words,
begin with a realist's view of the universe.

Rather, they start with

the assumption that whatever order we find in our lives is there be¬
cause we have created it and imposed it upon a genuinely chaotic world.
But, at the same time, the evidence and theories which I have used make
some progress toward explaining how it is that we do, in fact, impose
order on the universe.

The psychology thus begins with an assumption

that it, later, tries to explain and confirm.
cal, so much better for the philosophy!

And if that is paradoxi¬

So far so good - at least we

have the beginnings of a psychology which tries to explain its own
assumptions.
Now, the somewhat less obvious.

(
Assuming that a cognitive map

psychology can explain and defend the very assumptions on which it is
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grounded, how does that psychology explain and defend itself?

Here I

sit, a human being who, by virtue of that fact, presumably operates in
the ways I have been describing as true for all human beings.

I am

executing certain Plans, called on by certain Images all of which have
been built in by a lifetime of experiences and all of which, by my own
admission, are arbitrary ways for me to impose order on a chaotic world.
Does my psychology and my philosophy explain me?

Does it account for

itself and for my insistance upon inner maps, Plans, Images and the
rest?
To be honest, I’m not even sure of the best way to approach such
questions,

A complete autobiography would, of course, be helpful, for

then the reader could judge for himself the ways in which a cognitive
map theory would help explain my insistance upon cognitive maps.

But

more revealing, or at least easier, is a close look at this document.
As I cautioned in the Introduction, it must be seen as no more and no
less than a reflection of my own biases and commitments.

There is

literature, in psychology and philosophy, which I have not included
here because in its pure form it would contradict things that I believe.
Equally to the point is the fact that the astute reader will, at this
point, have a good idea of what literatures I am refering to and, at
the same time, will realize that if I did refer to them I would inter¬
pret them in my own particular way, so as to make them fit the
psychology and philosophy that I am espousing.
It is this latter point which, more than anything else, seems to me
to be crucial.

All that I am writing here, and all that I am not

writing, is a reflection of the screens, biases, and maps which I use in
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interpreting my world.

When I look at the world, when I talk about it,

and when I use categories to describe it I am inclined, or perhaps
forced, to do so in the very ways I have been describing.
in a very real sense, an autobiography.

This document

When I investigate human

beings I am inclined to look at the ways in which they screen perceptual
input and organize their chaotic experiences into a world.

Why?

Be¬

cause that is the way I screen my inputs and organize my chaotic
experiences,

When I look at humor and Japan I see the Zen view of an

undifferentiated universe, and at the same time realize that a different
observer (e.g.
ent,

the reader) might well see something completely differ¬

When I investigate the General Theory of Relativity I see the way

in which a strong commitment to a theory warps and interprets a meaning¬
less mass of data, realizing full well that other investigators of the
same events must find confirmation of their different biases there.

And

when I delve into the life of a Supreme Court Justice I must focus on
the ways in which that Justice’s biases have controlled his decisions,
because my own biases control my own decisions and perceptions.

Thus,

if there is any evidence available as to how my psychology and philosophy
help to explain themselves and my own development of them it is in the
ways in which my own biases and perceptual screens have produced this
document,
One last point regarding this complex issue.

Do I claim that my

statements in this document are "true" and should be taken as describing
a world existing outside of me?

Quite obviously not,

ing is the way in which I experience the world,
use to describe it.

What I am describ¬

the categories I

Some readers may be persuaded to change parts,
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small or large, of their cognitive maps by virtue of having read this.
Most readers will probably accept what fits their existing maps and
reject the rest.

So be it, for we all have our blinders on and mine

nonetheless in force for having been spelled out in detail here.
The philosophy and psychology under discussion, then, seem to tie
together fairly tightly.

First, in that they represent basic aspects

of one person’s Weltanschauung (mine).

More abstractly, in that they

mutually support each other's assumptions,

And finally, a new point

and the one which I suppose the reader has been anticipating for a
while, in that they support the same conclusion regarding who knows
what's best for individual learners.

Implicitly, all of the

philosophical and psychological arguments I have presented urge us to
the realization that individual learners are the best judges of what
they need to know at every point in their educational careers.

But

let me make those ties more explicit.
What we call "education" is concerned almost exclusively with the
development of cognitive maps as I have described them.

We teach our

students to slice the world up, categorize and systematize it, describe
and "explain" it verbally, and react to it on the basis of those
categories.

But if the world is, "in fact", undifferentiated, then any

system of categories will do as well as any other.

There is no right _

or wrong in terms of slicing up a world which isn't "really" sliced up,
In a world where categories are the products of man's minds and not of
__things-in-themselves , the educator's curriculum is an arbitrary thing,
possessing no Authority beyond that contained in the educator’s commit¬
ment to it.

The teacher seeks to pass on his knowledge to his students,
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but the key to his knowledge is his commltment to a vast system of
arbitrary, ultimately indefensible categories, ideas, and theories.
Viewed from the perspective of the "world-hologram”,

the compulsory

system of education which we so cherish is scarcely short of an imirense
perversion,

A group of educators who do not have, and never could have,

any special comer on The Truth are able,

through what amounts of brute

power, to determine for students the ways in which they will see the
world, divide it into categories and, thus, react to it.

There is, and

can be, nothing special about the particular way that educators
categorize the world but, nevertheless, compulsory education will assure
that all students are required to experience the world that way.

We

will consider some of the practical disadvantages of such a system in
the next chapter, but without wishing to sound too much the moralist I
would suggest that this monopoly of power, this excessive control of
our students’ lives and perspectives, is at best indefensible and at
worst catastrophic.

There is no One Best Way to categorize the world,

and we are constantly deceiving ourselves and our students by perpetuat¬
ing an educational system which assumes not only that there is such a
Way but also that educators know it,

at least in broad outline.

It might, of course, be argued that the world-hologram notion, if
taken seriously, does compel a certain kind of education for everyone
an education quite different from that which we currently label as such,
That is, we might argue that the task of education ought to be one of
making sure that all students participate in acts of knowledge, living
in, mystical experiences as often as possible,
ation,

As a lofty aim for educ¬

this program is eminently attractive to me.

As I shall mention
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briefly in the next chapter, I see it as one of the major problems of
our times that students ao not have the opportunity to become committed
to something, to lose them-selves , to be creative - to live in.

But

adding the contemporary notion of compulsion to that lofty ideal seems
to me not only useless but positively harmful.

For the crucial element

of the act of knowledge is the personal involvement and commitment
inherent in that act.
commitment.

And I_ cannot force you to feel that sense of

Indeed, as the Zen literature so aptly demonstrates it is

even impossible for me to force myself into a ’’self-loss" experience.
The harder one tries,

the more one is compelled either by himself or

especially by others, the less likely it is to occur.
existential literature

2

In fact, the

would suggest that one key road to a living-

in experience is the experience and feeling of complete freedom.

In

any case, coercion and acts of knowledge do not go well together.

I

would greatly hope that more of us could experience the universe in its
undifferentiated wholeness, but the very best we could do as educators
would be to provide likely possibilities for students and then give
them maximum, freedom to explore and find a sense of commitment.

More

than anything else, it is the element of compulsion in our current
system which stands between students and acts of knowledge,

By pushing

them in the directions that we want them to go, we mitigate against the
possibility that they will become so enraptured by something of their
own as to live in it and thereby gain knowledge.
Psychologically, our system of compulsory education is equally in¬
defensible,

In my terms, what we commonly label as education is the

process of trying to change other people's cognitive maps so that they
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contain categories, screens, ideas, or theories that we want them to
contain.

But remember that cognitive maps change only when they have

to - i.e. when they meet with some discrepancy between what they pre¬
dict and what happens.
(1)

This can occur in several ways, to be sure:

My fact-Images may not square with input from my senses;

(2)

Two

or more of my fact- or value-images may conflict when brought to mind
simultaneously (Koestler’s ACT OF CREATION);

(3)

I may be frustrated

in attempts to achieve some value-images by lack of suitable Plans.
Thus , we can. psychologically, describe different kinds of situations
in which people will be motivated to learn - to change their internal
representations of the world.
But the educator of the modern world is far more audacious than
that.

By virtue of his prescription of a curriculum’s "scope and

sequence" and his further prescription of the way in which material is
presented, he presumes to know what each student needs to know at all
points in his educational career.
sumption.
experiences

Therein lies the height of pre¬

Faced with a class of, say, thirty students whose life
(and thus cognitive maps) differ very considerably, how is

the teacher to know who needs what, when, and in what form?

How does

the teacher look into each student’s cognitive map, see what discrep¬
ancies

(actual or potential) are there to be resolved, and then provide

a common experience which will fill in all of his students’
factorily?

Seen in this light,

gaps satis¬

the task of educating one student, much

less a class of thirty,

takes on a rather different perspective - one
i
which ought to strike fear into the heart of any teacher who feels he
is slightly less than omniscient.
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Psychologically, the question of who knows what a person needs to
know boils down to the more basic question of who knows a person’s
mind.

Granted that my cognitive map is enormously complex and contains

many screens, assumptions, and discrepancies that I am blissfully un¬
aware of, I would be hard-pressed to defend the notion that anyone else
besides me can gain a greater knowledge of that internal map than I
currently have.

To put it much more simply, I do not know myself per¬

fectly by any matter of means, but 1 know myself better than anyone
else does or can.

The current structure of compulsory education

assumes that such is not the case.

It assumes, in fact, that educators

can prescribe for all children what they need to know, when they
ought to learn it, and how that learning can best occur.

Unless

educators are considerably more clairvoyant than I have been led to
believe, that assumption is challenged by a fairly impressive body of
cognitive and physiological psychology.
Individual students, then, are always the best judges of what
they need to learn at every point in their lives.

First, because in

an uncategorized world no-one has or can have a comer on Knowledge.
Second, because individual human beings know their own minds better
than anyone else does or can.

Having traveled through eight chapters

of philosophy and psychology, the reader is right back to where we
started in the Introduction,

To some extent I might rightfully be

accused of playing cat and mouse.

It would be difficult indeed for me

to assure the reader that my conclusion regarding who knows what's
(

best for students is based on the preceding seven chapters of arguments
For those seven chapters are equally based on this chapter's conclusion
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It is, if you will, a chicken-and-the-egg problem as I warned the read¬
er in the Introduction,

Quite frankly, it makes little difference to

me which is conclusion and which is premise.

The whole thing makes

a fairly neat bundle and you are free to look at it from whichever
end you please.
At this point, however, I will let the point stand on however
secure a theoretical base I have been able to build for it.

In theory,

at least, students know what they need to learn better than anyone else.
In practice, what happens in schools that violate this principle?

If

we look at schools and classrooms that claim to know what students
should leam, what can we say about the effects on students?

And if

those effects makes us uncomfortable about our entire educational
system, where do we go from here?

If compulsion destroys meaningful

education, how do we educate without compulsion?

Now that we have

emerged from the trees and can see the forest, I wish to turn briefly
to such pragmatic questions.

I

CHAPTER

IX

Those who can, do.
Those who can't, teach.
can't teach, teach teachers.

Those who

I do not think it would be an exaggeration to say that education
in America is but a hair's breadth from disaster.

Ours is a mystify—

ingly complex society and it is not being served well by an educational
system which changes far too slowly.

In an age where men are circling

- -the moon, we continue to have a high school curriculum that includes
Latin.

In an age when mankind has the capability for blowing himself

off the planet ten times over, we have difficulty conceiving of
education as anything but 30 students required to listen to one teacher
for 50 minutes in a classroom a century old.

At a time when human

problems have become so large as to outweigh all else, when cities are
about to explode and suburbs stare on in apathy, we continue to insist
that courses in History of Education and English Methods will produce
good teachers.

And in a society becoming increasingly sensitive about

issues of power, the schools still reign supreme over their students,
despite growing protests.
It is, of course, this last point which seems to me to be the crux
of the matter.

Unlike so many educators, I am not the least bit sure

that I or anyone else could successfully describe what ought to be in
the curriculum for all students or what kinds of teachers we ought to
have in our schools.

I have my pet subjects, and to me they seem

virtually indispensable.

And I have had some outstanding teachers who
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would serve as my models if I ever undertook the task of describing
the ideal teacher.

But these are nothing more than my peculiar biases

in curriculum and teaching, no more nor less defensible than those of
any other educator, and all of them are far less defensible than a
student’s biases, when it comes to educating that student.
Education, after all - whether compulsory or not - is for students,
and who can possibly know a student’s needs better than the student
himself?

But our present system of education simply does not recognize

a student’s capacity for self-knowledge.

At all levels, from kinder¬

garten through doctoral programs, and in virtually all of its aspects,
from the teacher to the curriculum planner, American education wallows
in the deception that it can prescribe what is best for its students.
We formally require that students be in school at least eight years, and
the economic structure of our society is more and more requiring 16
years of school as job preparation.

And having forced their physical

presence in schools, we proceed to carefully order, according to our
biases, the "learning environments" of our students.
The school, not the student, decides what the student will study,
for how long, in what circumstances, and in what sequence.

The school

even decides what time of each day the student should be thinking about
what subjects.

From nine to ten every morning, the student should be •

a mathematician, but at ten he should become a linguist and at eleven an
expert on state capitols.

And woe unto the student who has a brilliant

mathematical insight during "English time"!

And, to make the bizarre
I

outrageous,

the teacher even controls what the student should think and

say within each of those hours.

If the student doesn’t know the right
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answer when he’s called on, it does him little good to have known it
five minutes earlier or to learn it five minutes later.

To talk in

class about matters which the teacher finds irrelevant borders on the
sinful, however relevant it might seem to a student.
To some extent, I will admit to creating a strawman, a parody of
our public school system.

But I would hasten to add that, to a large

extent, our schools are themselves a vicious parody of education.

What

amazes me most about them is the extent to which they control the lives
of their students.

And what frightens me most about many recent

developments in "scientific" education is that the desire of educators
is for more, not less, control.

Dogmatism has always horrified and

perplexed me, but to see it institutionalized in schools is more than
I can bear.

It is the conception which we have of the schools as

authorities on what every child should learn and how he can best learn
it that seems to me to be ruining the educations of most students.

I

have already devoted eight chapters to explaining why, in principle, I
think that assumption is wrong, but on a practical level the assumption
ends up being almost malicious.
The dangers of school dogmatism are most apparent and saddening in
its dealings with "below average" students, a point which an anecdote
might best illustrate.

One of the most enthusiastic, alive groups of ■

students I have ever taught was a group at the "bottom 20 per cent" at a
somewhat "below average" high school.
school,

Of course, the students hated

found it immensely boring, disliked most of their teachers and
I

all of the school rules,

found the curriculum totally irrelevant to

their interests, and in general disagreed with everything the school had
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to say.

But what amazed and frightened me was that they agreed with

the school on one crucial point:

it categorized them as stupid trouble¬

makers, and despite their hatred of school, they agreed.

Furthermore,

the school equated "being smart" with "being a good person", and so did
my students.

Twelve years of schooling had done almost nothing positive

for these students by way of helping them to learn skills or relevant
branches of knowledge, but it had been brutually successful in a
negative way.

It had so destroyed their images of themselves as to make

them feel they were stupid, worthless, troublesome human beings.
It seems to me very important to understand what is going on in
a situation like this and exactly how it is that the school’s assumption
of its own authority is so successfully devastating these students.

For

one thing, it is becoming increasingly obvious that much of America’s
current difficulty in educating its black students hinges on exactly the
same factors - the x^hite school's power to set and enforce standards of
what is a good human being.
authors like John Holt

1

And for another, the anecdotal works of

and Paul Goodman

2

suggest that the same attitude

in the schools interferes with the learning of all of its students, how¬
ever "bright" they might be by conventional standards.
What was happening to my students, and what is currently happening
in schools throughout the country, is that the school defined for them
what, when, and how they should learn, all the way through their
educational careers.

The definition of learning and ability to learn

(and hence, in our society, quality of human-hood) was prescribed by
the schools and literally forced on its students with no thought or
credit given to the students’ different interests, styles, motivations,
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or abilities.

And if a student didn't learn in the narrowly delineated

ways that the school set forth, then he was incapable of learning and
somewhat subhuman.

If I had to consciously devise a scheme for destroy¬

ing the self-images of students and preventing them from learning, I
doubt that I could do better than what the schools already have done.
The student who is simply not interested in the narrow range of things
that the school has to offer, or whose cognitive map is different than
his teachers' and hence attuned to different kinds of information, must
leave such a system convinced of his own inferiority and inability to
learn anything.
What we have, in essence, is a school system which assumes that it
knows what cognitive maps (world-views) its students ought to have and
assumes that it knows the procedures which students must follow to
build that cognitive map.

The system is dreadfully wrong on both counts,

and students who reject its instruction must sense this, but the
students,

too, accept these assumptions and interpret their own failures

accordingly.

And, worst of all, the schools are unable to see how wrong

those two assumptions are and how damaging they can be to students.

The

schools do not and cannot prescribe for students what they ought to know
- the "right" way to categorize the universe - for there is no such
beast.

The curriculum that we force students to accept (or to reject on

peril of destroying themselves) does not represent The One True Way to
look at the world, and what makes it dangerous is not the fact that it
is wrong in the way it slices up the world, but that it presumes to be
Right with a capital "r".

No, it's even worse than that, for the schools

have the power of compulsion to make students believe that they are
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Right and any student who sees the world differently is Wrong.

And the

schools only compound error upon error by assuming that they know the
best ways to assure that students get what is Right.

For by prescribing

the sequence of a curriculum, the Training of teachers, and the nature
of the classroom situation for all students, the schools virtually
assure that many students will fail.

The cognitive maps of students in

school are as diverse as we could possibly conceive, and however
sophisticated the Educators’ Instructional Method might be, it will
inevitably fail to mesh with the minds of many students if only because
the educator cannot see into those minds and thus cannot know what
pieces will fit into the puzzle in what order.
John Holt’s HOW CHILDREN FAIL, Jonathan Kozol’s DEATH AT AN EARLY
AGE,

3

and Herbert Kohl’s 36 CHILDREN

A

seem to me the best popular

descriptions of the ways in which school dogmatism can destroy students.
Somehox^, due to the legal authority vested in the schools and their
crucial link to the American economic ladder, failure at school comes to
be quickly equated with failure as a human being.

And this entire

atmosphere of fear of failure permeates our school systems at all levels
- from failing to graduate,
the graduating class,

to failing to be in the top 10 per cent of

to failing a particular course,

answer a particular question correctly.

to failing to

Instead of being an educational

environment the school grotesquely transforms itself into a proving
grounds for self-hood.

If you meet the pre-set criteria of educators, a

very narrow set indeed, you are a good person and if you don t you re
not.

Those criteria are, of course, arbitrary, narrow, haphazard and

totally inappropriate for a lot of students, but nevertheless they are
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the standards against which we judge our students and, ultimately, our
students judge themselves.

It’s the last half of the preceding sentence

that is most troublesome, for it is something which we have systemati¬
cally failed to notice.
not,

But whether we pay attention to the fact or

the schools do, by virtue of their compulsory nature and their

attitude of supreme rectitude, mould the judgements of their students
about themselves.

And since the system has such a narrow tolerance for

what constitutes good performance in school, a frighteningly large
number of students leave the system with truly miserable opinions of
their self worth.
But the effects of compulsion on "good" students, though less
frequently noticed and less socially controversial than what I have been
describing, seem to me to be equally severe and depressing.

The

students who "make it" in our current system have done so because they
succeed at playing our game in what we consider to be an exemplary
manner.

If they feel good about themselves (and they do so to a greater

extent than that "bottom 20 per cent") it is because they, too, have
accepted the schools’ criteria of what is a good person and what is not.
And deeply embedded within those criteria is the implicit (and sometimes
explicit) notion
(i.e.

teachers)

that a good person is one who does what his superiors
tell him; one who accepts their standards, their values,

their interpretations, and their styles of living.

Whatever else a

good student in current American schools might be, he is definitely not
a person who respects and follows his inner light.
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When I talk about "good" students, I am, of course, primarily
referring to tnose in suourban settings where a major criterion of
"good" is going on to college.

And many of the problems which I see

the schools helping to foster in such students through their compulsory
nature have been vividly described in Kenneth Keniston’s THE UNCOMMITTED.
His description of the suburban student (and his parents) matches those
of such authors as Paul Goodman^ and Edgar Friedenberg^ and paints a
fairly uncomplimentary picture of the effects of compulsion upon "good"
students.

Forced into a school and community situation which is

severely limited in its diversity, such students emerge with a severe
lack of sensitivity to basic differences in world view, with a fairly
deep-seated conviction that the middle class school’s values are right
for all human beings, with a complete lack of awareness of the rich
diversity in ethnic, religious, and economic climates that exist in
America, and with a large dose of "uncommittedness" and apathy.
These "good" students have gone through a school system which has
told them, authoritatively and with the backing of their parents, how
to look at the world, what to know, what is good and what is bad, and
what standards to use in evaluating themselves and others.

Above all,

they have learned that it is good to do what you are told, especially if
the teller is a teacher who, presumably, knows what's best for you.
Such students certainly do not trust their own judgement, their own
ability to make decisions for themselves, or their own values and
feelings.

In fact, it is sometimes doubtful that they even have values,

feelings, and judgement of their own.

In any case, what values they

have and operate by are not the result of close personal inspection and
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J
existential commitment.

They have been committed to a set of values

and a world view by others without ever having made the difficult,
emotional, personal commitment to those values which would give them
fn some very real sense they are machines, acting out the
commands of others, with no sense of personal involvement, risk,
enthusiasm - in a word, with no sense of being alive.
To claim that all of this is a result of the compulsory nature of
schools would be an over-simplification which is too extreme for even
me to make,

The parental environment, the entire suburban culture

and, indeed, the gargantuan social forces that are operating in
Twentieth Century America are all implicated in the "good" (as well as
the "bad") student's plight.

But to deny the role of the compulsory

school in fostering a lack of self-direction is equally disastrous,

for

the role is there and is, perhaps, more subject to change than some of
the other factors which seem to be involved.

Again, let me illustrate

briefly from my classroom experience.
I was teaching a class of high school seniors in an upper middle
class school (near a prestige University) and the students were
definitely college material, all of them.
fairly obvious one:

The first revelation was a

by asking them why they wanted to go to college I

quickly found that they had never even considered the possibility of not
going.

They had no idea of any

possible alternatives to going to col¬

lege, and had "just always assumed" it was good for them to go to college
right after high school,

The title of the course was "American

^

History" and that frequently set the stage for other revelations,
our class discussions drifted away from history into psychology or

When
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philosophy, the students always became more responsive, alive, and
involved.
history.

But at the same time they felt guilty for not learning
They enjoyed learning psychology,

philosophy.

And they even enjoyed learning history in an unconvention¬

al manner (e.g.
people).

They enjoyed learning

theories of history or the personal lives of famous

But they would frequently complain about "not learning what

we’re supposed to be learning" even though that (stale, textbook history)
was boring and repugnant to them.

Finally, though these students were

given the opportunity to explore any area that they wished in any way
they wished without penalty

(they had the ultimate voice on their grades

in the course) most of them had extreme difficulty in deciding on some¬
thing to explore and few of them, over the course of a semester, ever
got deeply involved in something that interested them.
trast to another class

This is in con¬

(the bottom 20 per cent of a very "average" high

school) whose students responded creatively and enthusiastically to the
same challenge.
"What we can glean from this," to paraphrase a Judy Henske song,
"is that the students had the wrong attitude about a lot of things."
They simply did not trust their own interests, their own values, their
ability to make choices for themselves,

Although they disliked standard

history, they felt a strong compulsion to sit through it anyway since
that’s what their mentors expected of them.

They had swallowed, with¬

out question, the values of their suburban teachers and had great
difficulty in conceiving of (much less adopting) any other set of values
And when their personal opinions, values, ideas, or goals did not fit
the standard pattern, they trusted to the pattern, not to themselves.
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They would rather be bored learning what the teacher wanted them to
learn than to be excited and involved in something that they wanted to
learn.

To put it another way, they had great confidence in their

ability to play the teacher's academic game successfully, but no
confidence whatsoever in their ability to invent their own rules,

To

merely ask them what they believed firmly in, what they held so dear
that they’d give their lives for it, what they could get so involved in
as to disregard the rest of the world, was to ask them a totally mean¬
ingless question.

They believed in obedience to their teachers and

could hardly conceive of such a thing as personal commitment.
The extent to which such qualities in students can be traced to
the compulsory nature of education is, of course, difficult to deter¬
mine.

There are other social forces

(particularly in the middle class

suburb) which tend to work in the same direction.

But, be that as

it may, it is still the case that compulsion in the schools does leave
little room for a student to set his own standards, adopt his own world
"view, and live with his own set of commitments.

When an educational

critic like John Holt, for example, berates the schools for inducing a
f,fear of failure" he is , I think; speaking very much to the same point.
It is not, I submit,

that Mr. Holt wants us to prevent standards from

ever seeing themselves as failing

by_

their own standards,

natural, and perhaps even healthy, human process.

for that is a

The danger lies in

the fact that the compulsory school automatically sets the standards of
failure* for the students,

If he fails to meet those standards, he sees
i

himself as a failure.

It is the fact that students are literally

coerced into accepting the schools'

rather limited and very arbitrary
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standards as the basis of their opinions of themselves that stands in
the way of any real education or any real personal growth.
The compulsory nature of education, then, stands in the way of
many of the most important things we would all like to see happen to
students.

It necessarily fails, by its narrowness of standards, to

capitalize on the rich diversity of perspectives which it otherwise
might foster.

It dangerously interferes with the student’s ability to

set his own value standards, define his personal worth to himself, and
feel that he is in control of his own destiny.

It fosters the kind of

student who is little above an automaton - accustomed to obeying orders,
unable to guide his own life, and completely unfamiliar with the feel¬
ing of control and commitment that is at the essence of being fully
alive.

And it even fails to supply its students with the skills and

category systems that the system sees as crucial to all students.

For

even in the teaching of skills like reading, the element of compulsion
in our educational system tends

to prevent students from learning as

quickly and pleasantly as they otherwise might.

When it is always the

teacher who decides when and how Johnny should learn to read, it is no
surprise that many Johnnies never learn to read.

The teacher, after

all, cannot see into Johnny’s mind and that is precisely what the
teacher would have to be able to do in order to really be in a position
to tell Johnny when and how to learn to read.
Compulsion and the concomitant lack of diversity and alternatives
for students, seem to me to be severely implicated in many of the
i
failures of modern education.

Let me conclude,

then, by briefly

describing the kinds of learning situations that would both be more in
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accord with the philosophy and psychology proposed here and would, at
the same time, help to remove those failures by removing compulsion
from the educational setting.

CHAPTER

X

Education and the Smell of Joy

What happens when a child learns under his own direction?

What

happens when no one is telling him what to learn, when to learn, or how
to learn, but he is free to pursue things as they interest him?

What

happens when adults are free to share their judgements with students,
but do not have an ax (grade)
judgements?

to use if the students reject those

In short, what happens when students are given total free¬

dom and responsibility for their own learning?
Let us consider some anecdotal examples of learning which seems to
come closer to the conditions of freedom suggested in the above
questions than does the typical American school.

A very young infant,

for example, learns a great deal about his world despite (or because
of?) the fact that no-one has prescribed a curriculum for him, told
him when to learn what, or designed a method for his learning.

He

learns to control his own body, to control general aspects of his
environment (indeed, he learns that there is an "I" and an "environment1
which can be separated from each other), that there are such things as
objects which are relatively permanent and do not disappear when not
observed.,,.
talk.

He learns to crawl, to walk, to understand words, and to

We could go on and on with the enormous list of basic concepts

and skills that young infants and children learn without ever being
coerced into learning - indeed, with no one having the slightest idea
of how to teach them such things if they wanted to.
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Or consider the, again, pre-school child’s intense fascination
with the world around him; his ability to look at a single flower for
hours or to repeat a simple act over and over and over again; his at
times incessant and, for his parents, unbearable asking of that nasty
little question, "Why?1 ; his general ability and desire to do things,
learn things, build a meaningful world for himself.

Now I am not just

trying to make an old point about "the natural curiosity of children."
It is true that children are by nature curious in the sense that they
begin with a world almost completely lacking in structure and have much
need to make sense of it - i,e.

to build their own cognitive maps.

But I am more interested in the kind of learning that goes on in such
situations as I have mentioned.

They are situations which differ from

school experience primarily in the fact that there is no formal struc¬
ture, no one has set their educational goals and means for them, they
are free to explore their world and build it on their own.

Is the

quality of their learning different from that in the schools?
I would claim that it is, substantially so.

The self-directed

learning of young children is characterized by precisely that sense of
commitment and total involvement which is usually lacking in the schools.
Learning,

for an infant who is not told that he must learn something,

is a joyful experience.
new skill (e.g.

A young child can be literally enraptured by a

closing his fist, sticking out his tongue) that he xs

learning, or a new phenomenon (a flower, a rock, etc.) that he is trying
to build into his view of the world,
children, and so they revel in it,

There is joy in learning for young
It is no surprise to me that our

earliest years are our most crucial ones.

We learn far more in Qur
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earliest years than we will ever learn in the rest of our lives, and
the learning we were engaged in then was characterized by the smell of
joy.

It is as we got older, as we learned that we ought to learn what

certain other people thought we should learn, as we lost the freedom to
pursue the things that genuinely interested us at the moment, that
learning became unpleasant and that we began learning less and less.
We are creatures of joy, seeking pleasure, and compulsion drives the
joy out of learning.
We can, of course, find other examples of the smell of joy in free
learning involving students much older than the pre-school child.

They

are more rare since our educational system does not foster them, but
they exist.

There are students who become absorbed in particular topics

of their own choosing, usually to the teacher's dismay but occasionally
with his approval.

Virtually every school has those few students who

are real experts on something-or-other through their own initiative.
And many students at all levels thrive to some extent by using the
compulsory school as an intellectual supermarket - taking what they need
or want and sleeping through the rest,

The point is net that learning

stops when the schools take over, but that the schools do virtually
nothing to foster self-directed, committed, joyful learning.

To do so

is to admit that students know what's best for themselves educationally,
and the schools are far from admitting that.
The best example that I know of to illustrate the potential power
of self-directed learning comes from an as-yet unpublished experiment
performed by Robert Hager.

The experiment involved adults, but I con¬

sider that to be irrelevant for it is the comparison between teacher-
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directed and student-directed learning that I wish to center on.

Hager

was hired to write a programmed instruction manual which could replace
a 10-day course which was being used to train women to read electrical
meter dials.

Mager wrote the text, and was enormously pleased to find

that women who worked with it for merely eight hours could read the
dials as well as those who graduated from the 10-day training program.
Had the experiment stopped there it would have been interesting, but
irrelevant to this discussion,
But Hager then created a third condition for learning to read the
dials.

He told a group of women about all of the resources which were

available to them that might help them learn to read the dials people whom they could question, dials they could practice on, the pro¬
grammed texts, other books, etc.

Then he turned them loose and told

them to go about learning however they wished.

The women went off in

all different directions, some to play with the dials, some to read,
some to ask questions.

In an average time of TWENTY MINUTES this group

was more proficient at reading the dials than either of the two pre¬
ceding groups.

When given a wide range of alternatives and allowed to

structure their learning as they, individually, wished their learning
was substantially more efficient than when they were required to follow
someone else’s prescription.
There are other "experiments" which appear to teach the same
lesson.

The Leicestershire County Schools and Summerliill in England,

several private schools in America (e.g. The Sudbury Valley School,
Pacifica High School in California, some Summerhi11-modeled schools),
and several public schools in American which are providing substantial

109
amounts of 'unstructured time" for their students seem to be pointing
the way toward giving students responsibility for their own learning.
Much theory and some practice suggest that we need to devise ways to
allow students to have control of their own educations, so let us
briefly consider some possible changes in American education that
might move in that direction.

The variety of changes in education that

would help students to control their own educational careers is as
diverse as the ways in which compulsion currently exists in the system.
The coercion is explicit in our compulsory attendance laws which re¬
quire students to be in school, usually through the age of 16 or 18.
It is more implicit, but nonetheless real in the growing economic
necessity of going to college and, thus, the

college's control through

its admissions criteria of the lower school's curriculum.

But compul¬

sion is present at much more discreet levels within each school.

It

takes the form of dress codes, closed campuses and closed classrooms,
narrow curricula which offer no choice to students,

rigid classrooms

which offer no choice within given courses, and perhaps most clearly and
disastrously in the form of teacher-assigned grades.
This entire problem of assigning grades to students for their work
in particular courses is such an old one and has been discussed so
lengthily that I wish only to mention it in passing.

Whatever else can

be said, it must still be admitted that grades are a problem, and the
current trend toward basing grades on performance criteria or behavioral
objectives will not get to what I believe to be the heart of the matter.
Whether they are grades assigned at the teacher's whim or elaborately
defined behavioral objectives, we are still left with a situation where
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the student is evaluated by a teacher, in the light of a teacher's
standards, and succeeds only when he performs the way the teacher wants
hrm to,

However loose, unstructured, and student-centered a classroom

might be, the fatal element of compulsion is always lurking around the
corner if the teacher assigns grades to his students.

With the power

to grade, the teacher can always let the ax fall when the students
aren t doing what he wants them to do.

If there can be real freedom in

a teacher-graded classroom, it must always be tinged with a substantial
amount of fear and distrust of the grade-giver.

The students are free

in what they do only so long as the teacher doesn't drop the ax,

It is

like being free to scamper in a meadow in full knowledge that an expert
marksman is standing over you with full power and ability to cut the
scamper short whenever he so desires.
Any proposal which attempts to remove any of the above-described
elements of compulsion in American education would be an important step
toward making education more sensible, at least in light of the consid¬
erations in this document.

For a start, let us consider the largest,

most impractical, and probably most effective possible step.
were really committed to giving students

If we

the final responsibility for

their own learning, we might begin by abolishing all compulsory, public
education and leaving the entire educational system on a free enterprise
basis,

The idea here is for students to have a real choice in all

matters relating to their education in the
in modern America - through money.

way which has most authority

As I envision it, a free enterprise

system of education would enable students to pick and choose among a
great variety of educational opportunities.

The system would operate by
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a sort of Intellectual Law of Supply and Demand.

Students would create

the demand by having money to spend on educational experiences, and
the demand would be met by a wide variety of individuals, groups, and
corporations who wished to make their fortunes by supplying what the
students demanded and could pay for.
As I see it, an educational system which literally allowed students
to buy whatever kinds of education they could find on the market would
literally shower students with possibilities.

Individual teachers

would "hang cut their shingles", groups would form educational clinics,
corporations would invest in large educational centers, all sorts of
people would develop and advertise educational experiences which they
felt would tap the needs of students.

Those teachers and/or experiences

which did, in fact, meet a felt need of students would survive and even
flourish.

Those which failed to meet the needs of students or which

students merely found too distasteful or irrelevant to pay for, would
die a quick financial death.

The key elements to the success of such

.a. venture would be first that it would provide a rich diversity of
possibilities for students and second that students would individually
have control over the experiences which they encountered and collective¬
ly would have control over the variety which was available to them.
Insofar as the market remained open, insofar as monopolies were pre¬
vented and competition for student resources existed, insofar as educa¬
tional possibilities were well advertised to students, and insofar as
students

(rather than their parents or, indirectly, college admissions

criteria or college board exams or some other institutional criteria)
had real control over the spending of their educational funds, a free
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enterprise educational system would successfully eliminate compulsion
from education and provide a rich atmosphere wherein students could
learn joyfully the things they found to be most relevant.
There are complications and difficulties with such a proposal
ranging from parental control of student's choices to the ethics of
the large corporation.

Were this a different book, I might spend more

time in dealing with such problems but I wish here only to suggest a
diversity of proposals which might help to implement the philosophical
and psycholcgical considerations I have already dealt with.

Further¬

more, the free enterprise notion of education is not a new one, and
the interested reader is encouraged to look at similar proposals made
by Milton Friedman and by Jencks and Reismann.

Furthermore, I have

dealt with some of the practical issues involved in free enterprise
education in a bit more depth in my "The Free Enterprise Teacher",
School and Society, April 1969.
There are several other levels at which compulsion can be removed
-from education so as to make it more relevant and more joyful by
allowing it to be more personal.

We could, for example, retain public

educational institutions but fill each school, from kindergarten
through college, with a rich diversity of alternative courses and
experiences,

letting the student pick whichever of the offerings he

deemed to be relevant to him, in any sequence and for any length of
time.

Instead of having lock-step, scope-and-sequence curricula,

the

public schools and their teachers could serve as resource centers to
students.

Supplying alternatives which students freely selected, and
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which survived and died out

on the basis of student demand and

interest.
One way to make such a publicly student-directed system work
would be to replace the current notion of a transcript and grades with
a student portfolio.

Throughout his educational career, a student

could compile a portfolio which included his descriptions of his
educational experiences,

the comments of others on those experiences,

an accumulation of the student's work (e.g. papers, films, drawings,
machines the student has built, etc.), and a series of comments and
reflections by teachers on the student's perceived strengths and
weaknesses.

The portfolio, and an abstract of it, could serve as the

basis for any decisions which some educational institutions

(e.g.

colleges) might want to make regarding admissions, and could also
serve as a basis for the decisions of future employers.

Prather than

accumulating a record of courses taken and grades earned, the student
would assemble a portfolio which described his experiences as
evaluated by himself and others and would thereby be free to engage in
whatever educational activities he wished, rather than being forced
through a prescribed curriculum over which he has no control.

But

compulsion can be removed at even more discrete levels than that of
individual institutions and school-wide portfolio systems.

Individual

teachers can operate their individual classrooms in such a way as to
leave the student free to make his own educational decisions.
in fact, a fairly simple procedural matter.

It is,

If the teacher merely

assigns to his students the responsibility for evaluating themselves,
for giving themselves the final grade in his course, then the individual
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classroom can be opened up so as to allow students a great measure of
educational freedom.

When students evaluate their own progress, they

are free to accept or reject the judgements and offerings of the teach¬
er as they see fit.

If the teacher’s activities in the classroom are

not meeting his needs, the student is free to go elsewhere and pursue
whatever he wishes, without having to fear the teacher’s power to drop
the ax.

When the student grades himself, he^ has the ax, and with it

the power, freedom, and responsibility to guide his own learning.

In

such a situation, the role of the teacher quickly shifts from one of
authoritative dispenser of information and wisdom to one of resourceprovider and possibly even a helpful human being.
For the teacher, the act of giving over his ax to his students,
though initially sometimes a threatening process, can be an immensely
rewarding and freeing experience.

Both students and teacher can benefit

from the increased openness and honesty which an ax-less teacher can
display.

Without the power to enforce his judgements arbitrarily on

his students, the teacher is free to share his judgements and personal
biases as a human being interested in his students, but not in control
of their lives.

When students grade themselves, teachers are free to

be human beings instead of presuming to be authorities, and students
are free to rely on their own judgement even if it conflicts with the
teacher’s .
We would continue to catalogue specific proposals for change of
this nature in education almost endlessly — teacher education programs
could encourage and help teachers to conduct student-directed class-
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rooms; administration programs could encourage the adoption of the
portfolio, no-requirement approach; institutions of higher education
could give serious reconsideration to their narrow entrance criteria
and the effects they have on lower schools, etc.

But to put the whole

thing very bluntly, all such changes will ultimately rest on a sub¬
stantial change in the attitudes of Americans in general and educators
in particular.

As long as we continue to believe that students need

our direction and authority in order to become "good" people; as long
as we believe that we know what is best for students; as long as we
distrust the judgement of our students, we will continue to assure that
we have the power of compulsion over their lives.
But if we did believe in our students then we would be quick to
entrust them with the freedom and responsibility to govern their own
educations.

We would realize that it is unnecessary, and even harmful,

for us to require all students to learn to read at an early age,
give but one example.

to

We would realize that if we took the responsi¬

bility to provide several different avenues for learning to read, and
made sure that they were open to students without penalty at any age,
then students would learn to read if and when they decided it was
appropriate - the best possible time.

Some might learn at age four,

others might not feel the need until age 25 , and others might live
happy, productive lives without ever learning to read.

To insist that

all people must learn to read at age six because we know it is crucial
to their lives and because we1 re afraid they will fail to realize the
importance is to blatantly display our lack of confidence in the judge'
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ment and self-directing powers of students.
tried to show,

It is also, as I have

to fly in the face of a substantial body of philosophy

and psychology which makes our assumption of omniscience highly
questionable.
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